Showing posts with label Development. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Development. Show all posts

Tuesday, July 12, 2011

Of Currency Wars and Capital Controls

As a student of South-South cooperation--no matter how its ambitious goals are often negligible or even contradictory in practice--international bodies promoting such cooperation are of interest to me. One of these happens to be the South Centre, which sends me newsletters every so often either because I subscribed sometime ago or they discovered my research interests in third world issues. It describes itself as an "intergovernmental policy think tank of developing countries" and its HQ is in, er, Geneva. I'd like to think of the location as a manifestation of many important international organizations being based there such as various UN bodies and the WTO. My home country being one of the many LDCs funding this think tank (including China and the DPRK), I have naturally made use of its output once in a while, though it's not always that I agree with its stances.

However, Yilmaz Akyuz recently had a contribution that caught my eye on the quasi-eternal topic of international capital flows. There are, of course, two versions of this story. The first is the one we often hear from the likes of Martin Wolf and other apologists for subprime globalization that goes like something like this:
  • LDCs should welcome capital flows since they are more attractive investment destinations with more future growth opportunities than developed ones;
  • However, LDCs keen on maintaining export competitiveness are wary of local currency appreciation that such inflows bring;
  • Hence, capital controls imposed by developing countries to limit inflows unnaturally distort the global economy and promote economic imbalances
On the other hand, you have the Guido Mantega [1, 2] "international currency war" version:
  • Excessively loose fiscal and monetary policies in developed countries have caused hardships for developing ones by in effect exporting inflation as manifested by heightened prices for food, energy and commodities in the Global South;
  • Meanwhile, exchange rate policies of benign neglect encourage beggar-thy-neighbour competitive devaluations against LDCs;
  • By using capital controls, therefore, LDCs are merely trying to protect themselves from destabilizing policies emanating from developed countries
This coming from the South Centre, you should not be surprised that the second version is what's being promoted here. The major thesis is that large capital inflows tend to precede economic crises felt in the developing world such as the Latin American debt crisis and the Asian contagion. We are said to be on the verge of another lest LDC policymakers introduce capital controls:
Like these past episodes, the current surge in capital inflows is creating fragility in DCs. Deficit countries including Brazil, India, South Africa and Turkey are experiencing currency appreciations faster than surplus economies and relying on capital flows to meet growing external shortfalls. Many of those that have been successful in maintaining strong payments positions are facing credit and asset bubbles. Both categories are now exposed to the risk of instability to a greater extent than during the subprime debacle, though in different ways.

It is almost impossible to predict the timing of capital reversals or their trigger, even when the conditions driving the boom are clearly unsustainable. Still, it is safe to assume that the historically low interest rates in AEs cannot be maintained indefinitely and the current boom can be expected to end as interest rates start to edge up.
And what worse baddie is there under than the USA?
The US is now under deflation-like conditions and the Fed is aiming at creating inflation in goods and asset markets. But its policies are adding more to the commodity boom and credit expansion and asset price rises in DCs.

If commodity prices are kept up by strong growth in China, the continued policy of easy money in the US, along with speculation and political unrest in Arab countries, the Fed may end up facing inflation, but not the kind it wants. In such a case, capital and commodity booms may end in much the same way as the first post-war boom ended in the early 1980s — that is, by a rapid monetary tightening in the US even before the economy fully recovers from the subprime crisis.

The boom may also be ended by a sharp slowdown in China. As a result of a massive stimulus programme financed by cheap credits, large capital inflows and rising commodity prices, the Chinese economy is overheating. Monetary breaks now applied to control inflation could reduce growth considerably, particularly if it pricks the property bubble. The consequent fall in commodity prices could be aggravated by the exit of large sums from commodity futures, creating payments difficulties in commodity-rich economies and leading to extreme risk aversion and flight to safety.

Regardless of how the current surge in capital flows may end, it is likely to coincide with a reversal of commodity prices. The most vulnerable countries are those which have been enjoying the dual benefits of global liquidity expansion. Most of these are in Latin America and Africa and some are running growing deficits despite the commodity bonanza.

When policies falter in managing capital flows, there is no limit to the damage that international finance can inflict on an economy. Multilateral arrangements lack effective mechanisms that restrict beggar-my-neighbour policies by reserve issuers or enforce control on outflows at the source.

The task falls on recipient countries. But many developing countries still adopt a hands-off approach to capital inflows while others have been making half-hearted attempts to control them through taxes that are too low to match large arbitrage profits promised by interest rate differentials and currency appreciations. In either case taking capital controls much more seriously is now the order of the day.
It begs the question of who beggars which neighbours. It kind of beggars belief that we are still in roughly the same place as were when the G20 processes started in being rather more interested in apportioning blame than in devising mutually acceptable solutions. While I am obviously more attuned to the second version of events, I believe that such solutions do exist, but more on those later. Meanwhile, I remain relaxed about imposing such controls.

Wednesday, June 29, 2011

Countering Rising Food Prices at the G-20 (Sort Of)

In case you missed it, the G-20 recently held a meeting of agricultural ministers in gay (as in happy) Paris. Given the wide range of global governance problems, focusing on things other than finance is welcome even if they ultimately return to matters of Mammon. France being the current head of the G-20 as well as the EU's largest agricultural producer and the world's second largest exporter of such products--its interest in the matter is evident. That said, we too came to an impasse over two important agricultural matters at the aforementioned meeting.

First, government subsidies for the production of biofuels remains a hot topic. Some blame diversion of food crops to biofuels as one reason for soaring food prices. Certainly, I would distinguish among the cost-effectiveness of such solutions. The US programme is a massive financial boondoggle, whereas that of Brazil has established its economic rationale for quite some time. At any rate, the UN Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) believes that curtailing such subsidies should alleviate price rises hurting some of the countries hardest hit by rising food prices. A recent NY Times op-ed has this to say on the matter:
The price of agricultural commodities has surged by more than a third over the past year — cereal prices by 70 percent — surpassing even the levels that sparked widespread food riots in 2008. According to the World Bank, the rise in prices pushed 44 million more people into hunger in the second half of 2010.

It is disappointing that the agriculture ministers from the 20 large industrial economies who gathered last week in Paris failed to end two policies that are a big part of the problem: bans on agricultural exports by certain producers and government supports for food-based biofuel production.

A report for the Group of 20 meeting by the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Bank and others noted that eliminating or curtailing these policies would help mitigate the spikes in prices that have deepened hunger in the poorest countries in the world.

The United States, Brazil and several other biofuel makers opposed an agreement to cut support for biofuels. This country is the world’s biggest ethanol producer. The 13.5 billion gallons made here last year used about 40 percent of the nation’s corn crop. Government supports include a nearly $6 billion annual subsidy for ethanol makers.

The ministers agreed only to further study the relation between biofuel production and food prices. That is just an excuse for continuing to protect these industries. The cost should be clear to all by this point. The report to the Group of 20 noted that biofuels consumed 20 percent of the global sugar cane crop between 2007 and 2009, when food prices soared, as well as 4 percent of the beet crop and 9 percent of the world’s production of coarse grains like corn.
There's also the matter of major agricultural producers refusing to export their products, also exacerbating high prices worldwide:
The ministers also failed to forbid the use of export barriers to hold down food prices at home. Argentina [see my earlier post on its soy export limits], Russia and more than two dozen others have adopted bans since prices began to surge, sending global prices even higher and discouraging investment in food producing regions. The ministers did agree that countries could not restrict sales to the World Food Program so it can continue to address crises. It is not enough.
That said, the speculation-wary Sarkozy has shown his influence in putting in place mechanisms for determining if rising prices are due less to supply and demand dynamics but trader profiteering, howsoever defined:
The agricultural summit meeting, the first of its kind, did make some progress. The participants agreed to set up a system to monitor world food stocks and production to prevent misinformation that can contribute to price fluctuations. They also agreed on a pilot program for an emergency food reserve system to respond to shortages in vulnerable countries.
The Guardian also has a summary of other areas discussed if you are further interested in this important topic.

Wednesday, June 22, 2011

Why PRC-Led Global Rebalancing is Unlikely

How can we transition into a more balanced world economy? Today, Jean-Michel Severino joined the man generally associated with the topic, Martin Wolf, in trying to suggest ways of doing so at the LSE. Martin Wolf's take is generally well-known as he regularly issues commentaries in the Financial Times where he is the chief economics commentator. However, Jean-Michel Severino, formerly of the World Bank and late of the French development agency Agence francaise de developpement (AFD), was something of a revelation to me.

Severino argues that, considering postwar history, the stand-out example of economic development remains that of export-led development. However, this poses an obvious quandary: while almost every sensibly run nation on earth professes increasing exports to be desirable, global markets represent finite demand. In other words, unless we can export to, say, Mars, we are bumping up against logical limits to what can be absorbed if developing countries continue to pursue export-led development as one would expect them to do given its track record.

The usual answer is to create demand in export-led economies as a transition that must be made in order to facilitate global rebalancing. However, the track record of the pioneers of such export-led growth is not encouraging. For many different reasons--inertia and demographics among them--Germany and Japan have singularly failed to make this transition. It is far easier to stick to "tried-and-tested" formulas for success that, truth be told, hamper processes of global rebalancing.

So we come to China. The PRC is famously prone to calling for changes in its economy. Remember Wen Jiabao calling his country's economy unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated, and unsustainable in 2007? The Communist Party's 11th Five-Year Plan dating from 2006 already alluded to creating more domestic demand. Suffice to say that, in the five years since then, it hasn't really materialized. And yet the 12th Five-Year Plan makes similar allusions. Although one certainly hopes China can create domestic demand on an appreciable scale, you have precious few instances--if any--of major exporters making this shift. Alike Germany and Japan, China too faces demographic challenges of a largely programmed nature due to modern incarnations of its one-child policy.

However, given the sheer size of China and the magnitude of its contributions to global economic imbalances, pressures for it to help in processes of rebalancing are appreciably greater. I surely hope it manages this feat for the odds are certainly against it and there are definitely ingrained habits of relying on exports already whose lock-in effects need to be counteracted lest we lurch into another 2008-style disturbance. Martin Wolf made the fearful point that both 1929 and the advent of the WWII were in their own ways significant rebalancing acts [!] Hopefully matters don't come to such drastic conclusions, but you never know.

Tuesday, June 21, 2011

Come 2050, Half of the World Will Live in Slums

Having published in a geography journal sometime ago, I take a natural interest in urban studies as a field of study. To be honest, I cannot determine what distinguishes a social science work from one in human geography. Being ever so pedantic, I like pointing out that social science research is inescapably grounded in spatial coordinates, hence the near-automaticity of it being "geographic."

That qualifier aside, urban studies should be of great interest to practically everyone interested in the social sciences. Sometime in 2008, more than half of the world's population lived in urban areas for the first time in human history. This shift necessitates thinking about how to make urban environs more liveable given that more and more persons now choose to live in closer proximity to one another. Civil engineering and urban planning are among the many applied sciences gaining practical interest in solving challenges facing urban dwellers. Not that they are particularly unique and now constitute a majority of the world's population as the demographic transition continues apace or arguably even accelerates.

While this ongoing shift to city life provides many with newfound opportunities, urban blight remains a particular concern. A few days ago, another research centre here, LSE Cities, launched its latest photo essay / statistical compilation entitled Living in the Endless City. (The previous volume was simply entitled Endless City.) Among other factoids like the one in the title, cities constitute 2% of the Earth's surface area but hold 53% of its population. An ever-worsening byproduct of this movement towards massive cities is the expansion of slums. Often lacking access to water, electricity, sanitation and other things we take for granted, they pose challenges to any urban planner. In the past, they used to be viewed entirely negatively, but more recent research now considers them in different ways. Though significant problems obviously remain, they offer some uniquely creative solutions to unavoidable problems alike space utilization and have often bred entrepreneurial activity.

Unfortunately perhaps, Living in the Endless City paints a rather more pessimistic view of what's to come that borders on the Malthusian. Why do people choose to live in conditions of increasingly shared misery exemplified by megacities? Although previous megalopolises were already impressive conurbations, the future portends--you guessed it--the endless city:
Fifty per cent of the world's population currently live in cities with 33 per cent of city dwellers currently living in slums. By 2050, 75 per cent will live in cities with half the world's population will be living in slums...

Cities and their designs matter. With half of the seven billion people on earth living in cities, a substantial portion of global GDP will be invested in energy and resources to accommodate new city dwellers over the next decades. The cities of the 21st century will see new waves of urban construction, and the shape of our cities will have profound impacts on the ecological balance of the planet, and on the human conditions of people growing up and growing old in cities.

Living in the Endless Cities sets out to address pressing issues, such as why are so many cities continuing to grow? What is the complex relationship between urban form and city life? How can we intervene at all levels to bring about positive change? Has the model for the western city become redundant in the face of globalisation?

The investigations of the Urban Age Project have found that cities are becoming more spatially fragmented, more socially divisive and more environmentally destructive. These are the challenges and threats faced by the next generation of urban leaders who are tasked with steering their cities through what will be complex and difficult times. But the narratives also suggest that cities are uniquely placed to harness their human and environmental potential, guiding urban growth towards greater social and environmental equity. This will be the main task for the mayors, governors and city leaders of the emerging cities in the future.
The future is still up in the air. As if global governance did not have enough challenges yet, add the milieu of urban sprawl on a previously unimaginable scale to everything else. From American-style gated communities to a gated planet (inequality); city dwellers living in close proximity who are virtual strangers to a world of strangers (social division); and infrequent municipal trash collection to planetary heaps of waste (pollution): cities will be the locations where the global human drama will unfold in the coming decades, for better or worse.

Friday, June 3, 2011

Coming Soon: South Sudan, World's 193rd Country

98.83%--that's the percentage of South Sudanese voters who chose independence at the polls in December 2010. As someone not naturally disposed to fairy-tale endings, it is nonetheless heartening to note that the South Sudanese are firmly on the road to independence. On 9 July, it will become official--South Sudan will become the world's 193rd country. In a manner of speaking, it's the latest in a still-unfolding saga of Africans coping with borders most often arbitrarily drawn up by imperial powers. The white man's territorial demarcations have often been contested with huge losses of life.

While flipping through the LSE alumni magazine Connect, I found a very interesting article by Mareike Schomerus on this very topic. As you'd have guessed, severe challenges remain. While Khartoum was a distant and rather non-functional government, it is unfortunately the case that Juba isn't much of an improvement in governance at the present time. Even if replacing a remote Arab-Muslim regime with a local African-Christian/animist one is clearly desired, symbolism needs to be backed up by action. And so it is that the world's newest country will face classic state-building problems from inception--infrastructure, education, and other public services need to be provided for by a fledgling state:
Unsurprisingly, when the [election] results were announced a few weeks later, an
overwhelming 98.83 per cent of the southerners who went to the polls had voted
for independence. Although there were reports of rigging and forced voting, it
was clear that the Southern Sudanese wanted to leave Khartoum behind.

The decision on independence had been a long time coming. Southerners often refer to this moment as “a correction”: they think that Sudan should have been split in two at independence in 1956 to reflect what they see as the distinct characters of the two parts of the country. Instead, a bloody civil war ensued between north and south and lasted, with a brief respite in the 1970s, until the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The referendum on independence was anchored in the peace agreement, an ambitious undertaking in a country with minimal to no infrastructure and a largely illiterate population that had suffered tremendously from decades of war violence.
There too is the problem of building identification with a new state whose past has not been very functional. Hence the resort to alternative providers of security (militias), settlement of land disputes, and the allocation of water:
Significantly, many citizens of the nation felt only a tenuous connection to a government that has delivered limited improvement since the peace deal was signed. People resorted to what they had known during the war: to rely on violence for survival. The fledgling state structures provide limited rule of law or justice procedures to stop violence. In the new independent country, providing reliable state structures and connecting to the citizens who have voted the new country into existence will be the government’s main challenge.

Yet it is not only the government that is important. People living close to the new north-south border, with minimal connection to the far-away government structures of Juba, tend to organise their lives not with the help of their government, but despite the government. Few people in the marginal areas of South Sudan – and the margin here is very large – expect change and governance to come from Juba. For many, the state has been so conspicuously absent as an accountable organising force that other governing mechanisms are more important. These might be local institutions to deal with crime, to mitigate disputes over land usage, to administer water sources.

It will take a long time to effectively devolve South Sudan from the central government, so it is necessary to better understand how in reality people tackle the challenges of their everyday lives. To make use of such local structures for development policies requires a deep understanding of how they work and whether they are fair and of equal benefit to all. It may be trite but true: South Sudanese are better of devising their own form of government which builds upon customs and tradition instead of importing Western institutions wholesale. Let's just say the latter path has not fared so well.
Before I conclude, also see a recent Christian Science Monitor article on the challenges of regularizing South Sudanese rebels, the Sudan People's Libertion Army SPLA. While the SPLA was one of the major parties during the peace talks which led to the 2005 agreement, let's say that its revolutionary ways have not yet been redirected towards keeping the peace instead of mounting regular skirmishes with the north.

It's going to be a long, difficult process, but nobody said that independence was an easy option--especially in a place which has virtually known little but hardship.

Tuesday, May 24, 2011

Realizing the ($134 Trillion GDP) Asian Century

With all due to apologies to the late economic historian Angus Maddison (requiescat in pace), will half of world GDP be accounted for by Asia in 2050? It may seem a far-fetched notion now, but the Asian Development Bank has a new report out which suggests it's within the bounds of plausibility.

The key to achieving this feat says the ADB is for populous and fast-growing China, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam (two SE Asian countries, yay!) not to fall into a middle-income trap. That is, not succumbing to slowing growth rates and concomitantly stagnating income levels in the next five to ten years. If this trap is avoided, Asian GDP may approach $148 trillion and account for 51% of global output by 2050. But, if the region falls into this trap, it will "only" account for 32% of global output with a combined GDP of $61 trillion. It almost makes you proud to be an Asian during this exciting time when old Europe and enervated America are busy competing to see who can flush their continents down the toilet of history faster (I got tired of the dustbin of history, so there).

While these eye-catching figures are more conjectural than anything else, the challenges listed of making more optimistic scenarios come true are certainly worth paying attention to as we try and realize the Asian Century. Focuses the mind, eh? What follows are the key snippets from the executive summary, though the rest is well worth reading for all of those interested in geopolitics and IPE:
Makings of the Asian Century

The Asian Century scenario essentially extends Asia’s past success into the future, putting it on the cusp of a truly historic transformation. In this scenario, Asia’s GDP (market exchange rates) would increase from $16 trillion in 2010 to $148 trillion in 2050, or half of global GDP, similar to its share of the global population. With a per capita GDP of $38,600 (PPP), Asia in 2050 would have incomes similar to Europe today. It would have no poor countries (with average per capita GDP of less than $1,000), compared with seven today. All this assumes that Asian economies can maintain their momentum for another 40 years and adapt to shifting global economic and technological environment by continually recreating their comparative advantage.

Actions at three levels

But in its march towards the Asian Century, the region must tackle daunting policy, institutional and governance challenges along the way. Given widely varying country conditions, the precise actions and their timing must vary. Still, it is possible to draw the contours of the major changes necessary for the region along three dimensions: (i) national strategic and policy actions; (ii) collective regional actions to bridge the national and global agendas; and (iii) Asia’s interactions with the global community (Figure 1). The ability of the diverse countries in Asia to realize the promise of the Asian Century will be determined by their success, individually and collectively, in addressing these imperatives.

Sunday, May 22, 2011

PRC Still Idolizes Singapore, Warts & All

While pointed commentaries in official Chinese publications on perceived slights by Westerners (particularly Americans) against China are common, you often don't see these publications going out of their way to defend others being the subject of foreign defamation. The target in question here is Singapore. A few days ago I commented on various opposition parties gaining a 40% share of the popular vote in Singapore--a one-party state since its inception under Harry Lee Kuan Yew's People's Action Party (PAP). These opposition parties would have gained a larger share of the legislature had a proportional representation (PR) system been in place instead of a first past the post one. You can certainly argue that the minuscule Workers Party gains--6 out of 87 seats--would have been greater had Singapore not been subject to fairly obvious gerrymandering.

It is a well-known story by now how Deng Xiaoping's 1978 visit to Singapore helped set China's authoritarian development plans in motion. Here was a tiny country making its way in the world without its longtime leaders losing their tight control on the reins of power. Not only has the Communist Party of China (CPC) tried to emulate the PAP, but it has also observed how Singaporean politics evolve. From the PAP website, no less:
Ties go beyond such physical developments. In 2002, Zeng Qinghong, an alternative member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) Central Committee and a member of the CPC’s Central Committee Secretariat put it in a nutshell when he received in Beijing a delegation led by PAP Central Exco member Lim Swee Say.

He said: “The CPC values learning from the PAP’s experience of governance. This has become an important element of the exchanges between both parties.” To this end, Chinese officials have sat in at meet-the-people sessions and noted PAP MPs’ familiarity with citizens’ concerns. They have gone back and launched their own regular meetings with the public.

As China’s political reforms continue, they keep returning to observe how Singapore handles other issues.
So perhaps it was never going to be the case that Singapore's recent election results would go down well with Beijing's powers-that-be. After all, here was a one-party state that delivered a high standard of living to its citizens being reprimanded by these very citizens. At the very least, let's say it's not quite conducive to continuing processes of Chinese political reform aimed at broadening public input following Singapore.

So, in this China Daily op-ed, the response is one of blaming Westerners for blowing the Singaporean elections out of proportion. Linking events in Singapore with those in the Middle East is particularly given short shrift. In a nutshell, "Westerners don't understand us Asians":
The opposition in Singapore's parliamentary elections made a breakthrough on May 7, winning six out of 87 seats in the parliament for the first time. Shortly afterwards, Lee Kuan Yew and [former PM] Goh Chok Tong announced that they would quit the cabinet, drawing more attention to the political situation in Singapore.

Many Western media agencies quickly associated the political system of Singapore with the retirement of Lee and Goh as well as the setback that the ruling party suffered in the parliamentary elections. A British media outlet published an editorial under the headline "Singapore is taking the First Steps to True Democracy," and another Western media outlet claimed in its report that Singapore has never had a "real two-party system."

The Western media said directly that the existing political system of Singapore is not "true democracy," implying that only Western democracy is the genuine democracy. Some Western media reports even related the political changes in Singapore to the unrest in West Asia and North Africa, claiming that they were all the results of the global wave of democratization.
Then the op-ed begins to conflate democratic processes with economic development:
It seems that the Western media have forgotten about Singapore's remarkable economic achievements in recent years. Singapore's GDP grew nearly 15 percent in 2010, making it the fastest-growing economy in the world, and it surpassed certain Western countries in terms of per capita income and social security coverage. However, these facts were seldom mentioned in Western media reports.

Obviously, the Western media are not interested in how Singapore achieved great economic progress because the Eastern country's successful development mode is not in line with Western democratic standards. People can be reminded of the Western media's stereotyped viewpoints by the fact that even now they still call Singapore a "dictatorship" or "quasi-dictatorship."

Objectively, the changes reflected by the elections in Singapore are mainly from two aspects. The first is the start of the adjustment to the leadership succession within the ruling party through the appointment of new leaders and the retirement of old ones. The second is the changes in the demand of the new generation of voters who hope to raise the voice of the opposition in the parliament rather than expect another party to replace the ruling People's Action Party. The adjustment and changes does not represent major unrest in Singapore's political system.
It then gets murkier with the suggestion that Singapore's woes are political rather than economic alike those of many Western countries:
Logically speaking, Singapore is already a developed country and should have the same status as developed Western countries, an assertion about which Western media agencies appear to disagree. Some Western countries are facing much more severe unrest compared with Singapore. Some European countries are deeply trapped in the debt crisis that will possibly cause a severe impact on the world economy.

However, are there any Western media agencies that have analyzed the problems in these countries from the angle of their political system? The issues facing Asian countries are surely issues involving their political systems, while the issues facing Western countries are limited to economic ones. Does this result from prejudice or ignorance?

Singapore does have its problems, but the problems facing Singapore are the ones that are emerging after it has developed to a rather high level. Public complaints about housing prices and the rise in the number of foreign workers are partly because of the higher demand generated by the people after they have led better lives and gained many benefits from development.

The future of Singapore does face challenges, but the challenges will surely not involve whether Singapore's political system will be closer to Western democracy or whether reforms coveted by some will occur. The real challenge is whether Singapore can continue the way of development that has been consistent with its context.

The political changes in West Asia and North Africa have made some Westerners more irrational about their political system and sharpened their sense of moral superiority. Such misconceptions and superiority are evidently not something constructive to the increasingly polarized world.
It's an odd mix: On one hand you have attempts towards self-reassurance--this is only a temporary setback for the PAP which has traditionally been responsive to the Singaporean people's concerns, China chose the right path in emulating Singapore, etc. On the other hand, movements towards democratization in the Middle East have also prompted suggestions that Western cultural imperialism is at work when foreign commentators mention Singapore's election results and Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and the rest in the same breath. Doesn't raising GDP per capita justify political continuity?

In the end, there's little denying that China filters through the prism of Singapore the ides of (Arab) spring. Just as the Chinese leadership successfully navigated through the events of 1989 to outlast the Soviet Eastern bloc, so too does it see Singapore as a proxy for the durability of the (mostly economic) reforms it has undertaken since then.

Make no mistake: 1.3 billion-plus person China very closely follows political-economic evolutions in comparatively tiny Singapore and its slightly more than 5 million citizens. In turn, do not forget which country commissioned a commemorative statue of Deng Xiaoping (see image at top). This is a mutual admiration society with more than a little narcissism shared by both mentor and mentee.

Thursday, May 19, 2011

Guns or Butter? UK's Defence v Foreign Aid Debate

OK, so this is not strictly an application of the economic textbook guns-or-butter question of whether a nation should devote its resources to military or civilian priorities given a production possibility frontier. After all, the recipients of the "butter" ain't her majesty's subjects. Given that the UK is not as free-spending as the US is--over there Cheneynomic free lunch ideology has been ascendant for at least a decade now--it's a meaningful tradeoff with implications for foreign policy. PM David Cameron says he's of the "Live Aid" generation in justifying the preservation of aid spending, but let's say right-leaning sorts have...other priorities.

The general outlines of this debate go like this: The Conservative-Liberal government indicates that it will live up to its coalition agreement to "ring fence" or protect 0.7% of British GDP for foreign aid by shielding it from government cuts occurring elsewhere. (See an earlier post of mine on how the 0.7% of GDP target came about.) To which the defence secretary, unsurprisingly, wishes to keep the option of reducing foreign aid contributions to spend on arms. Protect your turf is still the operating principle here. That is, more guns, less butter:
Defence Secretary Liam Fox has challenged a plan to enshrine in law the UK's promise to spend 0.7% of its gross national income on overseas aid. In a letter leaked to the Times, Dr Fox says he "cannot support the proposal in its current form". A source close to Dr Fox said the issue was not the level of the target but how best to reflect this in law.

Downing Street said it remained fully committed to implementing its pledge in line with the coalition agreement. The BBC understands Dr Fox's letter was written to Prime Minister David Cameron about five weeks ago. The defence secretary said that "creating a statutory requirement to spend 0.7%" on overseas aid could lead to legal challenges and limit the government's options on where money was spent.

International aid is one of only a handful of areas, including health spending in England, being ringfenced from spending cuts over the next four years. Most other departments are seeing their budgets slashed - defence spending by 8% by 2015.
Given that foreign aid is less than a third of defence spending as the graphic in the link in the article indicates. What's more, the UK has some ways to go to reach the 0.7% threshold from its current level of below than 0.6%:
The promise to spend 0.7% of national income on aid by 2013 was put in the Conservative manifesto before the last general election and then repeated in the coalition agreement. A Downing Street spokesman said it was "fully committed to enacting the 0.7% commitment into law, in line with the coalition agreement". The 0.7% commitment is an international aspiration first mooted by the United Nations in the 1970s and reaffirmed by the world's leading economies in 2002.

Aid and development charity Oxfam said Dr Fox was "wrong" to question the government's approach. "British aid offers great value to the taxpayer," its chief executive Barbara Stocking said. "For little more than a penny in the tax pound we not only help those in need but also boost our standing in the world and increase our influence in the global corridors of power."
In the real world where the rest of us live in where deficits do matter (got that, Yankee deficit lubber?), these debates are more than rhetorical.

Monday, May 16, 2011

The White Man's IMF Burden (Merkel Edition)

As expected, jockeying for the appointment of the next IMF managing director has begun. In an odd twist on the American deficit lubber's argument that medium-term fiscal consolidation is a desirable objective but not one in the near term since the US is just recovering from a deep recession, we have Europeans offering the same. Here, Europeans who still hold voting rights out of proportion with their share of the world economy claim that while medium-term diversity among heads of Bretton Woods institutions is a desirable goal, it shouldn't happen immediately given the pressing woes of peripheral European economies Greece, Ireland, and Portugal.

Again, I must point out my longstanding objection that the IMF is primarily meant to handle balance-of-payments crises, not fiscal ones alike those being experienced by the troubled trio. What is more, I am not alone in sensing fairly blatant favouritism that is hampering IMF reform to reflect the changing global balance of economic activity as well as a simple misallocation funds. Why should poor countries' IMF contributions be used to assist rich countries that don't really qualify for assistance as per the IMF's articles of agreement concerning BOP difficulties? The IMF shouldn't be a pet EU institution. But enough righteous indignation; here are the Europeans on this issue:
Mr Strauss-Kahn’s arrest on sex charges at the weekend prompted some commentators to declare it may be an opportunity for emerging market countries to take charge of the multilateral lender. But European officials on Monday asserted their case for keeping the top job for a European, as is customary, with Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, leading the charge. Ms Merkel told reporters on Monday that finding a replacement for Mr Strauss-Kahn was “not a question for today”, but given the sovereign debt crisis on the eurozone periphery there were “good reasons” to propose a European candidate...

Didier Reynders, the Belgian finance minister, argued on Monday that “it would be preferable if we continued to hold these posts in the future”.
It becomes a question of, first, to what extent will developing countries protest the continuation of the (neocolonial, perhaps) status quo? Second and based on LDC reactions, to what length will Europeans go to preserve the unwritten tradition of appointing a European head? Various commentators have suggested the Europeans will strike a deal with the Americans who've traditionally appointed the World Bank president to keep things as they are--you scratch my back, etc. Either way, I predict a fight on our hands if history repeats itself:
The comments by Ms Merkel and Mr Reynders suggest that Europe will fight to maintain the tradition at the two institutions. The number two job at the IMF, held by an American, will also become vacant soon when John Lipsky, who is running the fund in Mr Strauss-Kahn’s absence, steps down at the end of August.

Emerging market countries argue that it is unacceptable for Europe and America to continue to stitch up the top jobs even as developing nations take a growing share of the global economy.

However, even European countries that were willing to consider an emerging markets candidate for the IMF this time are having second thoughts now that the fund is central to short-term European interests. Ms Merkel said that developing countries had a right to the top jobs in the “midterm”.
Just as you don't cure American debt addicts by continually providing their fix, so you shouldn't expect Europeans to change their ways by embedding outmoded habits even further. The time of Turkey's Kemal Dervis or a similarly qualified LDC candidate is long overdue. Certainly, you can't say developed nations have an automatic right to lead the IMF by virtue of their superior economic management in this day and age.

Tuesday, May 10, 2011

Ghandian Ideas Don't Work in 21st Century India

I forgot to blog about this interesting WSJ piece from a few days back about how current efforts by the Congress Party to provide work to the mass of unemployed are quite lacklustre. Congress Party heirs of Gandhi and Nehru will of course be sensitive to questions of social justice, but you really must question if this is the way to go about it. Although it may provide more ammunition to rational choice types in providing state funds for dubious work projects, I believe that the broader matter of inequality and overall social stability deserves a broader framing than that. While the effects of globalization on inequality in developed countries are endlessly debated--hollowing out of the middle class, barbell society, etc--similar anxieties about how spoils are divided in an increasingly integrated world resonate in the developing world. Having defeated the BJP in the 2004 elections despite most expectations to the contrary given that India's economic resurgence was well underway, the Congress Party is well-attuned to the electoral consequences of those left behind. But is this the way to go?
India has its own version of America's Depression-era Works Progress Administration: a gigantic program designed to create jobs through building infrastructure in a developing nation's most-backward rural areas. But unlike its American counterpart eight decades ago, the Indian program, its detractors assert, is keeping the poor down, rather than uplifting them.

The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, as the $9 billion program is known, is riddled with corruption, according to senior government officials. Less than half of the projects begun since 2006—including new roads and irrigation systems—have been completed. Workers say they're frequently not paid in full or forced to pay bribes to get jobs, and aren't learning any new skills that could improve their long-term prospects and break the cycle of poverty.

In Nakrasar, a collection of villages in the dusty western state of Rajasthan, 19 unfinished projects for catching rain and raising the water table are all there is to show for a year's worth of work and $77,000 in program funds. No major roads have been built, no new homes, schools or hospitals or any infrastructure to speak of. At one site on a recent afternoon, around 200 workers sat idly around a bone-dry pit. "What's the big benefit?" said Gopal Ram Jat, a 40-year-old farmer in a white cotton head scarf. He says he has earned enough money through the program—about $200 in a year—to buy some extra food for his family, but not much else. "No public assets were made of any significance."

Scenes like this stand in stark contrast to India's image of a global capitalist powerhouse with surging growth and a liberalized economy. When it comes to combating rural poverty, the country looks more like a throwback to the India of old: a socialist-inspired state founded on Gandhian ideals of noble peasantry, self-sufficiency and a distaste for free enterprise [in a nutshell, swadeshi].

Workers in the rural employment program aren't allowed to use machines, for example, and have to dig instead with pick axes and shovels. The idea is to create as many jobs as possible for unskilled workers. But in practice, say critics, it means no one learns new skills, only basic projects get completed and the poor stay poor—dependent on government checks. "It actually works against the long-term future of the poor because it doesn't give them any long-term solutions to poverty," says Gurcharan Das, an author who has written about India's economic development. "It's a Band-Aid solution."

Indian officials acknowledge that the program is flawed, though they say it has provided an important safety net for the 50 million households, comprising more than 200 million people, that have participated in the past year alone. Proponents of the plan, including left-leaning economists and activists, say that because the pay is often better than other rural jobs, it has given workers a bargaining tool to demand higher wages. Echoing the Gandhian ideals for which the program is named, they say workers are also better off staying in their villages, close to their families, instead of moving to the cities in search of work and winding up in slums.

"The scheme has been a big success in creating employment for rural people," Sonia Gandhi, president of the ruling Congress party, told a meeting in February of officials who administer the program. "However, there have been complaints of irregularities and corruption, too."

Niten Chandra, a senior official at the federal rural affairs ministry, says the aim was never to build major highways or other large infrastructure, but to create work and raise wages. He says that state governments, whose job it is to monitor projects and ensure audits are carried out, are at fault for failing in many cases to guard against corruption and unfinished work...

The repercussions go far beyond irrigation projects. India's failure to uplift its poor and improve the economy in rural areas—where two thirds of the country's 1.2 billion people live, mostly untouched by the boom—threatens the country's growth, economists say. India has so far relied on its services industry in cities to fuel growth. But the country is running out of skilled workers and its agricultural dwellers are ill-suited to fill the gap. India's success or failure in boosting the size of its middle class will determine the long-term attractiveness of the market to foreign investors.

Yet the number of people relying on the program is expected to rise after the government earlier this year decided to tie wages to the cost of living, automatically increasing the 100-rupee maximum for a day's work to about 125 rupees in many states. That's higher in some places than the daily wage for farm labor. The result is that many more millions will likely become dependent on the government for income despite a two-decade-old push to reduce the state's role in the economy.
As quaint as it may sound, transitioning from agrarian to industrial or even post-industrial service-oriented societies is still the issue of the day in many of the world's emerging economies. With faith in "trickle-down" economics having been conclusively dashed via the example of developed economies where inequality remains on an upward trend, LDCs are experimenting with alternatives to redress this situation. Still, I have doubts whether a neo-primitivist work programme prone to corruption can help ensure the transition from agricultural-based societies as well as reduce inequalities on a sustained basis.

Monday, April 18, 2011

Mideast Migrant Spillover II: UK; Italy v France

On my walk home from work, I regularly pass by the statue of Bernard "Monty" Montgomery--a British war hero whose exploits in the desert sands made him famous. So, I just wanted to make a follow-up post on what I wrote on the "Pottery Barn" effect of European countries becoming involved (so there, I avoided using the word "intervention") in the Middle East / North Africa. We have two stories here. On a positive note, the land of Monty--Bernard Montgomery, 1st Viscount Montgomery of Alamein to be exact--appears to be returning to the desert in a big way. No, the UK isn't confronting Erwin Rommel's successor. Rather, it's supporting a ragtag army of rebels going up against the erstwhile Gadhafi regime. Given its involvement in the conflict, it's good the UK at least recognizes an obligation to evacuate the worst affected:
The UK is to help free 5,000 migrants trapped by fighting in western Libya, the UK's international development secretary has said. Andrew Mitchell said funds of £1.5m would pay to charter ships to get people out of the rebel-held town of Misrata and provide medical supplies. The minister is in New York attending a UN meeting to discuss the humanitarian situation in Libya.

Aid workers and Misrata residents have said the situation there is "dire". They have reported shortages of food, power, water and medicine, as forces loyal to Libyan leader Col Muammar Gaddafi intensify their shelling of the city. The BBC's Barbara Plett, reporting from the United Nations, said some of the most desperate were thousands of migrant workers from the Middle East, Africa and South Asia.

Mr Mitchell said Britain would help fund their evacuation in ships chartered by the International Organization for Migration. Further funds would go towards the International Medical Corps (IMC) to provide medical aid for those caught up in violence across western Libya, he added. The money comes from the department's humanitarian aid funds.
On a negative note, however, Italy's plan to let the migrant overflow from MENA go to neighbouring EU countries has not gone down well with the others to no one's real surprise. Given that France's desert involvement exceeds that of Italy, it's highly questionable why France tries to wall itself off from refugees coming from Italy. Let's first recount France's resurrection of borders in the post-EU age:
The migration wave unleashed by North African unrest has prompted France to resurrect its border with Italy—a barrier that was supposedly consigned to history's dustbin with Europe's unified economy.

A couple of miles from the beach town of Ventimiglia, nestled along the Italian Riviera, French police have restaffed a formerly abandoned checkpoint along the country's Mediterranean border with Italy. In the nearby French town of Menton, French police in riot gear board trains crossing into France, grilling passengers while other police forces are monitoring roads and foot trails that lead into French territory from Italy.

The operation is part of France's attempt to stop a wave of North African migrants who, having fled violence back home, regard Italy as a way station as they travel by boat, train and foot toward jobs and family in French cities. More than 700 migrants who have crossed into French territory via Italy have been detained by French police and escorted back, Italian officials said.
More recently, the Italians have lodged a diplomatic protest against the French over the matter. Towards a common EU migration policy? You must be joking:
A train carrying Tunisian immigrants from Italy was halted at the French border Sunday in an escalation of an international dispute over the fate of North African migrants fleeing political unrest for refuge in Europe. But France blamed what it said were hundreds of activists on the train planning a demonstration in France, and posing a problem to public order. Traffic was re-established by evening - but not before Italy lodged a formal protest.

“At no time was there a ... closing of the border between France and Italy,” French Interior Ministry spokesman Pierre-Henri Brandet said. It was an “isolated problem,” he said by telephone, “an undeclared demonstration. He estimated that up to 10 trains may have been affected, five on each side...

Italy has been giving temporary residence permits to many of the roughly 26,000 Tunisians who have gone to Italy to escape unrest in northern Africa in recent weeks. Many of the Tunisians have family ties or friends in France, the country’s former colonial ruler, and the Italian government says the permits should allow the Tunisians to go there under accords allowing visa-free travel among many European countries.
Dreams of a borderless Europe are fading as the French have come up with this excuse that activists were also on the train planning public disorder there. Let's see how long that excuse holds up as these inflows will certainly not come to a rapid halt:
France says it will honor the permits only if the migrants prove they can financially support themselves and it has instituted patrols on the Italian border - unprecedented since the introduction of the Schengen travel-free zone - bringing in about 80 riot police last week. Germany has said it would do the same. A spokesman for the Italian rail company, Maurizio Furia, told The Associated Press in Rome that the train carrying migrants and political activists who support them wasn’t allowed to pass into Menton, France, from the border station of Ventimiglia on Sunday.

Italy lodged a protest with the French government, calling the move “illegitimate and in clear violation of general European principles” the Italian Foreign Ministry said. Foreign Minister Franco Frattini ordered his envoy in Paris “to express the strong protest of the Italian government...”

“We have given the migrants travel documents, and we gave everything (else) that is needed, and the European Commission recognized that, it has said that Italy is following the Schengen rules,” Italian Interior Minister Roberto Maroni said in an interview on Italy’s Sky TG24 TV. Visa-“free travel is legitimate for all those with the papers and who want to go to France,” said Maroni, a top official of the anti-immigrant Northern League party, a main coalition partner of Premier Silvio Berlusconi.
To which we now arrive at the main problem of Sarkozy himself. Despite backing all sorts of uprisings in MENA, he also adopts an anti-immigration rhetoric. Are freedom of speech and association incompatible with freedom of movement? That's what I would like to ask President Sarkozy as further blowback from mucking about in his backyard is imminent:
While he has robustly backed pro-democracy movements in the Arab world, triggered by the Tunisian uprising, conservative President Nicolas Sarkozy is also trying to cut back on the number of migrants arriving in France, whose former colonies in North Africa already provide the majority of immigrants.
With muscular rhetoric must come deeds that back them up. One avenue is to promote sufficient stability and development in MENA states that reduces pressures to immigrate. I am certainly unsure whether European efforts at nation building will succeed where those of the Americans failed. Remember that the Europeans have a longstanding colonial history there and are bound to invite suspicion. Moreover, remember who preceded the Americans in Vietnam--an eventual economic success story...after the white people finally gave up and let the "freedom-hating" Communists have a go. (Is there a lesson in here somewhere?)

Until then, Sarkozy's lip service for freedom of speech and association will sit ill at ease with the French government's hardline policies on freedom of movement.

Tuesday, April 12, 2011

'WTO a Success...Advancing Rich Nation Interests'

And now for a characteristically pessimistic assessment of the WTO from trade commentator Rorden Wilkinson of Manchester University. As with many other international organizations, the WTO was undoubtedly structured to advance the interests of its creators. Read: the United States when Americans used to dream about the future (does anyone remember that bygone era?) Seen in this light, Professor Wilkinson says that the WTO has, actually, been quite a success in facilitating the interests of wealthy countries instead of the usual metrics of advancement such as completing trade rounds and so forth. What he now writes is that, historically speaking, successive WTO rounds demonstrate how the deck has been stacked--including some things in negotiations (manufactures in which developed countries have a comparative advantage) but not others (agriculture in which developing countries do), while strong-arming LDCs with quotas and suchlike if it suited (textiles). At the current time, you can certainly think of American unwillingness to even put temporary migration provisions of GATS into effect. Some fair trade regime; same old, same old.

What follows are the abstract and some policy implications on how this lopsided situation can begin to be remedied, while the rest can be read at the link provided. Given that rich country cheerleaders for trade liberalization aren't getting their way, perhaps it's time to look at wider-ranging changes to WTO governance to make a more decisive break with the past:

Abstract

This article offers an alternative account of the performance of the World Trade Organization (WTO) – an institution whose performance is usually assessed in terms of its capacity to function as a forum for the exchange of mutually beneficial trade concessions, its ability to act as an arena in which trade rules can be negotiated and its capacity to serve as a forum for settling trade disputes. The article argues that when understood in these ways, the performance of the WTO inevitably appears lacklustre. However, the fact that member states remain committed suggests that the criteria on which an assessment of the institution’s performance ought to be based are different and the way in which we conceive of the institution is flawed. The article argues that if WTO performance is measured as the institution’s capacity to act as a strategic device to maintain and exacerbate the advantages of a group of industrial states over their less powerful and developing counterparts (an aim that is much closer to the institution’s intended purpose), then it has actually been quite successful, albeit undesirably so.

Policy Implications
  • An alternative assessment of the performance of the WTO suggests that it has been far from lacklustre, as is commonly held to be the case, and has actually been quite successful in satisfying the interests of the leading industrial states.
  • However, such an assessment also shows how developing countries as a group have consistently been net losers in the multilateral trading system.
  • This situation is no longer tenable. There is a pressing need to reform the institution fundamentally to rebalance the economic opportunities afforded to developing countries, especially the poorest and most vulnerable, as well as to think seriously and differently about the design of the institution and the interests it serves.
  • Meaningful reform of the WTO cannot, however, come from minor adjustments to its operating procedures. What is needed instead is a much more wide-ranging discussion about its purpose, form and function, as well as the value of trade liberalisation (currently constructed or otherwise) as a vehicle for development and poverty reduction.

Wednesday, April 6, 2011

West Complains About Yunus Ouster from Grameen

[NOTE: This is the second of two posts reflecting on the ouster of Muhammad Yunus from Grameen as demanded by the Bangladeshi government.] Well it's finally happened: the Bangladeshi authorities have forced the removal of microfinance pioneer Muhammad Yunus from Grameen Bank. Although Yunus has his critics--witness Jagdish Bhagwati portraying him in a negative light in the post below as being Grameen v Bangladesh--I am still shocked that their government would treat someone of such renown so harshly. Yes, it's like bashing the Dalai Lama or criticizing Aang San Suu Kyi--something which won't go down too well with Western audiences. Once more invoking rather odious comparisons, Yunus' defenders are likening his treatment to the political persecution of Mikhail Khodorkovsky in Russia--too influential to meddle with electoral politics.

At any rate, the Western backlash has started more quickly than you can say "Moammar." First out of the chute are those diplomatic dervishes, the French (to no one's real surprise). From Auntie:
Both the US and France have lamented the removal of Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus from the Grameen micro-finance bank he founded. French President Nicolas Sarkozy has said his government will monitor developments and discuss the issue with the Bangladesh in the next few days. The US has warned Professor Yunus's removal could harm bilateral ties.

Meanwhile Bangladesh's Supreme Court has adjourned hearing two last-ditch petitions challenging the removal. Correspondents say neither of the petitions, which will now be heard on 2 May, has much chance of success and that Professor Yunus appears reconciled to leaving his job as managing director of the Grameen Bank.

President Sarkozy expressed his strong support to Professor Yunus in a letter released to the French press by Friends of Grameen, a voluntary organisation established to promote the microcredit activities of the bank and its affiliates. He wrote that the creation of the Grameen Bank "was an audacious initiative, which has been an ongoing source of inspiration for the international community".

"I know the difficulties you are going through at the present moment. I trust the institutions of your country will find a fair resolution to these...The French government will closely monitor the situation and will definitely address the issue with Bangladeshi authorities over the next few days."
As Hillary Clinton had already sided with Yunus instead of the Bangladeshi incumbent PM Sheikh Hasina prior to his ouster, the American response has unsurprisingly been negative as well:
The US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, Robert Blake, said on Tuesday said that his country had a "strong interest in maintaining close relations" with Bangladesh, which he called "a democratic and moderate Muslim country". But he told a congressional hearing he had, during a visit last month to Dhaka, "warned that a failure to find a compromise that respects Dr Yunus's global stature and maintains the integrity and effectiveness of Grameen could affect our bilateral relations".

On Tuesday the Supreme Court upheld the argument of the Bangladesh central bank that Professor Yunus had been improperly appointed while past retirement age. But Professor Yunus said the attempt to remove him from Grameen Bank had been politically motivated. The Grameen Bank has pioneered micro-lending to the poor by giving small loans to millions of borrowers.

It was in effect Prof Yunus's last legal option to keep his job as managing director of the Grameen Bank. In March Bangladesh's High Court ruled that his dismissal was legal. His supporters say he fell out with Bangladesh's Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina after trying to launch his own political party in 2007.
The BBC also has another story on the seemingly rapid downfall of Professor Yunus after signalling his intention of entering politics. Very Khodorkovsky-like, I must observe. It's odd but yes, I'll probably side with Missus Clinton in giving the microfinance pioneer the benefit of a doubt here.

At any rate, it is no longer unimaginable that the US will apply sanctions against poor Bangladesh over this incident (as if it needed more troubles aide from political instability and chronic flooding among others). Think of China being ostracised for the longest time, or Myanmar up to the present. Given that the US has provided Bangladesh with $5 billion in aid since it became a nation on one hand and that Bangladesh owns 25% of Grameen on the other, it's an interesting tug-of-war:
The U.S. has provided more than $5 billion of development assistance since 1971 to Bangladesh, according to U.S. government data...Bangladesh’s government owns 25 percent of Grameen, Yunus said, while customers hold the balance. The bank has lent $10.3 billion since it began operations in 1976 and had a loan recovery rate of 97 percent as of the end of February, according to the lender’s website.
It's depressing news, but don't shoot the messenger. For all his foibles, it makes you appreciate the tightrope industrialist-politician Silvio Berlusconi has navigated for years and years when canny operators like Yunus stumble at the first hurdle.

Dev't Battle: Jagdish Bhagwati v Muhammad Yunus

[NOTE: This is the first of two posts reflecting on the ouster of Muhammad Yunus from Grameen as demanded by the Bangladeshi government.] Here is a clash of the titans from the Indian subcontinent if there ever was one. On one side we have Jagdish Bhagwati, arguably the most influential international economist of his generation. On the other side we have Muhammad Yunus, Nobel Peace Prize winner and the man recognized by most for having popularized microfinance.

I make these qualifiers about Yunus and microfinance for a reason: Apparently, his fame has not gone down so well with a number of economic commentators--including Bhagwati. To wit, the venerable Professor Bhagwati highlights four criticisms of Yunus in a recent op-ed in Al Jazeera:

1. It wasn't Muhammad Yunus who invented microfinance but rather Ela Bhatt who founded the Self-Employed Women's Association (SEWA) in April 1974--two years before the former made his start in Jobram Bangladesh;
2. Yunus has relied on periodic inflows of foreign cash to keep Grameen afloat, whereas SEWA has never been reliant on foreign donors;
3. What is more, SEWA has been regulated by Indian authorities practically since its inception, while the same doesn't hold true for Grameen which resists such regulation;
4. Microfinance does not promote large-scale development.

There are interesting points which Muhammad Yunus would probably be better served rebutting himself. However, I can offer some counterpoints and suggestions here:

1. Yunus' innovation was perhaps more a case of marketing; that much is true. Prior to him, the term "microfinance" had barely entered the lexicon and was certainly not widespread worldwide. That said, why begin with SEWA? Those who've worked in development studies for any period of time are familiar with the Rotating Savings and Credit Association (ROSCA) which has similar features of credit pooling and turn-based lending among a small group. As far back as 1962, the famous anthropologist Clifford Geertz had already written about "The Rotating Credit Association: A 'Middle Rung' in Development." It's hardly an obscure work since Google claims it has 397 citations. ROSCA was already operative long before Geertz described it, so the origin of ROSCA certainly predates SEWA by an even more considerable margin. But if neither the ROSCA nor the SEWA folks coined the term "microfinance" despite having essentially similar mechanics, then I'll give Yunus the nod for doing so.

2. It would of course be good if Bhagwati came up with evidence to back his claim that could be very damaging to Yunus' operation not being self-sustaining by relying on periodic cash infusions from abroad.

3. It is incorrect to say that Bangladeshi microfinance institutions (MFIs) do not face banking regulation. Instead, they have a separate banking regulator in the Microcredit Regulatory Authority (MRA) which oversees their operations and has the power to impose sanctions. Instead of saying Grameen gets by with lax regulation, it would have been better if Bhagwati could explain why microfinance and conventional banking are similar enough to warrant coming under the same regulatory body (such as the Reserve Bank of India). Given India's own woes with allegedly usurious interest rates, the specificities of microfinance may warrant having a separate regulator as Bangladesh has decided to do. Yunus, after all, has been instrumental in creating a microfinance monitoring body in Bangladesh and calls for one in India as well:
“We have been lobbying for a regulatory authority in Bangladesh and as a result created the microcredit regulatory authority in Bangladesh,” Yunus said. “That’s what I have been recommending for India also.”
Speaking of which, Bhagwati should note this provision of Bangladesh's MRA:
MFIs should not be permitted to accept deposits from the non-member/ general public.
4. Alike many other things in development--remittances come to mind, personally--it is unlikely that microfinance is the "magic bullet" to development. Although some folks do a disservice as styling it as such, perhaps Yunus is even culpable to an extent. I personally think Clifford Geertz suggested as much since he termed ROSCA as a "middle rung" in development long before the chattering classes arrived on the scene. Microfinance is an intermediate stage in the development of financial institutions. That is, habituating folks climbing up the income ladder in the disciplines of borrowing, investment, and repayment is certainly not a bad thing when it comes to administering credit. Certainly the Americans--its government, states, municipalities and citizens--do not have a firm grip on such fundamentals given the parlous state of their finances at virtually every level of society.

It's interesting times for Grameen,to say the least.

Tuesday, February 15, 2011

BRICs Guy Jim O'Neill: China's Rise Benefits All

Jim O'Neill of Morgan Stanley should be familiar to one and all as the fellow who coined the acronym "BRICs" for the major emerging economies Brazil, Russia, India, and China (though he sometimes expresses regret putting Russia in there). Although a less neat acronym would be required, he's also alluded to including Mexico, South Korea, Turkey and Indonesia. While I'd be inclined not to include South Korea since it famously industrialized earlier as part of the Asian tigers and is not that large population-wise alongside the others, it's his list to make--not mine. Given his track record, he's definitely considered among the top popular commentators on the world economy.

Anyway, while reading the Evening Standard on my journey back from work, the prolific Jim O'Neill had yet another feature, this time on why China's economic rise shouldn't be feared but welcomed. In classic liberal fashion--he still represents an investment bank, after all--the win-win aspects are what he chooses to highlight. (It reminds me of Henry Paulson in his pre-Treasury days, actually.) The occasion was official confirmation that the Chinese economy had surpassed that of Japan--and not by a small margin, mind you:
Yesterday's estimate for Japan's GDP growth in the final quarter of 2010, or rather the lack of growth, was not a surprise. More interesting was that it confirmed China's status as the number two global economy. It wasn't even close: China's GDP stands at around $5.9 trillion, Japan at about $5.4 trillion. The speed of China's ascent relative to Japan is quite remarkable even by my own optimistic standards.

When back in 2001 I first looked at China's remarkable potential at the core of the broader BRIC group - Brazil, Russia, India and China - it wasn't even on my radar that China would overtake Japan as soon as 2010. I was ambitious enough to suggest China would surpass Germany. In 2003, when my team first looked at the world's 2050 potential, we expected China to overtake Japan by 2015. So it has happened five years early.

There is nothing quite like this China phenomenon in modern history. Since 2001, China's economy has grown by $4.3 trillion, in the process effectively creating more than another two of itself than existed in 2001. That growth is equivalent to creating more than two new United Kingdoms.

As the base size of China gets bigger, so does its impact. If China succeeds in growing by the forecasting consensus view of around nine per cent this year, with inflation at around four to five per cent and its currency rising a bit, the end of last year's $5.9 trillion will be close to $7 trillion by the end of this year. In other words, China will create the economic equivalent of another Korea in one year - or one-and-a-half UKs.

Contrary to many perceptions, China is not achieving this growth at everyone else's expense. That is an out-of-date story. Last year China's imports totalled close to $1.4 trillion, and they increased by a massive $400 billion in just that year. Maintained at this pace, within another five years, China's imports will be bigger than those of the US.

Quite simply, China is the single biggest story for us all - and I've been impressed by how the UK Government is grasping it, especially the need to export. This could be our get-out-of-jail-free card. Providing support and encouraging all our manufacturing and, perhaps even more importantly, our service businesses to penetrate further into China is critical.

In this regard, it is imperative that any controls on immigration [by the PRC] don't clash with the importance of this goal (which includes our educational exports too) for China and the other BRICs. It has become quite fashionable - again - to worry about China being some sort of bubble. I'm not sure why this view is so popular but it probably reflects a core belief that a non-democratic country cannot guide its economy to permanent success. Ultimately that might turn out to be true but the same accusations were made a decade ago - and look what has happened since.

The Chinese authorities will soon confirm their next five-year plan and its details. It is likely to embrace a further push towards their consumers and to take the economy away from being driven by exports. We should watch these developments at least as closely as our domestic budget: they are likely to be more important.
It's interesting stuff, though I don't think services liberalization for the benefit of Western firms will happen any more rapidly than it has in the past. Which is to say rather slow especially in financial services. Moreover, China isn't likely to be inundated with FILCH (Failed In London, CHina-bound) British expatriates unless they happen to speak fluent Mandarin. While I appreciate that financial deepening is something desirable in China, especially the provision of sophisticated forms of consumer credit that can make the PRC rely more on domestic instead of international consumption, the West has done itself no favours during the global financial crisis in inspiring confidence in this respect.

BTW, Manchester United fans will also know O'Neill as one of those who have tried to extricate the Red Devils from the revolting Glazer family. Alas, that is a work in progress--unlike the emergence of major emerging economies.

Monday, February 7, 2011

Robert Wade on De-Neoliberalizing the World Bank

Here's yet another interesting article from the new LSE house journal Global Policy. It all started in the second issue of this publication when Robert Wade, a famously "heterodox" economist in our development department, envisioned post-crisis options for developing states. In particular, he mentioned possibilities for something the World Bank has long disdained--industrial policy--correcting the belief that markets are self-obviously superior to states in such areas as disseminating information, determining prices, and allocating resources.

Well, the global financial crisis seems to have broken faith in these "neoliberal" beliefs. After all, a characteristically hypocritical North American nation fond of preaching the gospel of deregulation, liberalization, and privatization as the keys to economic heaven for errant developing countries suddenly began an unprecedented regime of reregulation (of financial services providers), deliberalization (of securities trading), and nationalization (of automakers and banks) when faced with its own crisis. Who's got "national champions" now, white man? Your industrial policy looks a lot like ours--but is far more encompassing in scale and scope. The picture to the right is the Storm Thorgerson-designed cover of Mars Volta's De-Loused in the Comatorium. While not my favourite listen, it may be an apt metaphor for what's happening with the excesses of neoliberalism--delousing subprime globalization as the Washington Consensus is left for dead.

It should thus be mentioned that no small amount of gloating has also emerged from those like Robert Wade and Ha-Joon Chang who've long argued for a more active role for states. To make a long story short, Justin Lin--the first non-G7 chief economist at the World Bank--did not disagree as much as you'd expect with Wade in his succeeding article in Global Policy. Rather, Lin had qualifiers on the extent to which industrial policy should be practised and under what circumstances. In turn, Wade has just issued his comment on Lin's reply. While it's true that the World Bank now has less influence over developing countries--again, many receive much more in the form of workers' remittances than official development aid provided by institutions like the Bank--its relaxation of a hardline market approach as represented by Lin's softer position represents a gradual meeting of minds according to Wade:
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Here are a few directions in which some vigorous pushing is needed, whether by the World Bank or others. First, on the supply side, is the distinction between ‘existing comparative advantage’ and ‘future’ or ‘latent’ or ‘dynamic’ comparative advantage. Most of the time Lin wishes to limit ‘interventions’ to helping firms exploit the opportunities offered in the existing comparative advantage – with the qualification that ‘economic development is a dynamic process that requires industrial upgrading’, a dynamic process that may change the existing comparative advantage and in which the government may have an important coordinating role. I wonder how to operationalize the distinction between existing and latent comparative advantage. Lin suggests that government and firms in country X should scrutinize the kinds of products and services produced in comparably endowed countries with per capita incomes roughly double X’s, and look for promising items or processes within this set. Indeed, Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese planners did do a lot of this ‘looking ahead down the river’ kind of exercise. But they often took target countries much more than twice as rich as they were at the time. And today, more than when the capitalist East Asians went through their fast-growth decades, there is more ‘vertical’ differentiation in the production of any one product, creating niches in the production of final products which, as final products, appear to be far beyond the ‘latent’ comparative advantage of country X (see my Governing the Market (Wade, 2004)).

This line of thinking invites serious attention to the rather neglected subject of industrial upgrading and diversification, including to the concept of stages of growth. It is remarkable how ideas about the transition from resource-based industries (for example, textiles and apparel) to heavy and chemical industries, to scale-sensitive assembly-based industries like automobiles and electronics, to Internet-based industries (all with very different appropriate roles of government) have largely disappeared from development economics. Here it is worth going back to the seminal work of the Japanese economist Akamatsu and his flying-geese theory of intra-industry evolution within one national economy and linked flying-geese theory of inter-country evolution in a hierarchical division of labor. Akamatsu published his main work before the Second World War. There is no better place to understand his arguments and see their application to development patterns of the past several decades than Terutomo Ozawa’s important new book, The Rise of Asia: The ‘Flying-Geese’ Theory of Tandem Growth and Regional Agglomeration (2009). Much of Lin’s thinking resonates with that of Akamatsu and Ozawa.

Another big hole in conventional development economics, which Lin and the World Bank could help to give more attention to, is on the demand side – above all, the tendency for wages to increase more slowly than productivity growth, which limits domestic demand and concentrates income and wealth at the top, distorting the economy by the efforts of the wealth holders to find ways to store their wealth (in natural resources, complex financial products, overseas bank accounts, political patronage). The World Bank could give its support to Rooseveltian measures like a legal minimum wage, cash transfers to the poor and guaranteed public sector employment at the minimum wage. The trouble is that its [Country Policy and Institutional Assessment] formula hard-wires in the assumption that a completely free, ‘undistorted’ labor market with virtually no worker protections is the ideal labor market for development. This needs to change.

A third – and for present purposes final – big hole in conventional development economics concerns the strong advantages of mobilizing domestic savings, as distinct from relying on foreign borrowing. For too long economists have presumed that foreign saving will help to raise domestic investment, downplaying its dangers – a presumption indirectly derived from the interests of western financial firms. No one was more adamant – and one eyed – about the need for free capital flows and for developing countries to borrow abroad to supplement domestic savings than Larry Summers, during and after his tenure as chief economist of the World Bank. One of the most eloquent arguments about the need for and methods for boosting domestic savings is set out by the Brazilian economist Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, in Globalization and Competition: Why Some Emergent Countries Succeed while Others Fall Behind (2010).
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IMHO, the intellectual terrain has shifted from "Should countries be allowed to use industrial policy?" to "How can industrial policy be gainfully applied?" While I still have some trouble with some of Wade's ideas (and Chang's for that matter), let's say we agree that Larry Summers is...not so great. Still, I'd certainly like to see examples other than Asian tigers being cited. If industrial policy can be made to work, then certainly there are other countries who've applied it to good effect, right?