Showing posts with label Neoliberalism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Neoliberalism. Show all posts

Tuesday, June 7, 2011

The Pinko Path: On Peru Joining Latin Left's Ranks

It's somewhat odd that the whitebread commentariat hasn't made more of this event, especially since it's happening in their own backyard. While dependencia theory of Latin American countries becoming pliant and fertile grounds for Western exploitation may have gone out of fashion in academic circles, the same does not necessarily hold with Latin American leadership struggles. In the run-up to the seventies when dependencia theory was in full bloom, you had the likes of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala and Salvador Allende in Chile whose political fates were--how do I put this--eased along by American intervention. Curiously enough, when leftist ideologies were supposed to have gone out of style, we have seen in the past few years the emergence of several new figures on the Latin left. The questions remain the same as ever: should we promote local industry or welcome foreign extractive concerns? Is there a way to reconcile both objectives to promote development? The faces may change but the essential issues remain the same.

Sure, the brothers Castro had their share of (short-lived) ideological peers over the intervening years. However, it is only in more recent decades that we have witnessed the rise of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, and Rafael Correa in Ecuador. (Prior to Fernando Henrique Cardoso becoming president of Brazil, he was one of the foremost dependencia authors, but turned out to be rather neoliberal upon assuming office.) And so it is that in this alleged twilight time for the Latin left that we have another potentially joining its ranks with the recent election victory of Ollanta Humala in Peru, stock-in-trade socialist firebrand rhetoric in hand.

Without a doubt, certain parts of the Andean business community are running scared as markets have reacted quite negatively:
Shock waves from leftist Ollanta Humala's victory in Peru's Sunday presidential election rattled stock markets and corporate suites around Latin America, as investors girded for the possibility of sweeping changes in one of the region's star economies. Peruvian stocks fell a record 12.5% on fears over increased government intervention in the economy after Mr. Humala's defeat of conservative Keiko Fujimori on Sunday [daughter of controversial former President Alberto Fujimori]. Nervousness also roiled shares of companies throughout the region with Peruvian investments, such as Grupo Mexico, a huge copper producer, and LAN Airlines, a Chilean based regional air carrier...

One of Mr. Humala's economic advisers, Kurt Burneo, tried to reassure markets that Mr. Humala wouldn't spoil an economic formula that has produced 12 consecutive years of growth. "I totally reject that a fiscal binge could happen," Mr. Burneo told Peruvian radio. He said Mr. Humala would be committed to maintaining growth and investment in order to fund his plans for greater social spending. "One point of growth of output generates an increase of 1.2% in tax revenue, thus it's key to continue growing, " Mr. Burneo said.

Mr. Burneo, a former vice minister of the economy in the centrist government of former President Alejandro Toledo who is well-liked by investors, underlines the questions surrounding Mr. Humala's government. Mr. Burneo joined Mr. Humala's campaign in the runoff race after Mr. Toledo was eliminated in the first round of voting, and it is unclear whether he represents Mr. Humala's current philosophy.

Analysts say there is often dissonance between the more moderate advisers who joined Mr. Humala after the first round and the more left-leaning ones who began with him. In a television interview Sunday, Felix Jimenez, a left-leaning economist who is part of the original Humala team, was still defending the interventionist 197-page governing proposal by Mr. Humala that spooked investors during the first voting round. That plan was replaced with a more mainstream five-page plan in the runoff.
So many years after, it's back to debating dependencia:
The Peru election is reviving an ideological debate that had seemed to be settled in Latin America between the largely market-oriented economies of Peru, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay ,and the more populist ones of Venezuela, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Bolivia. The latter seemed on the decline in recent years, beset by faltering economies and growing domestic political headaches, while the former grew more strongly and consistently. In 2005 to 2010, per capita gross income in Peru rose 82%, to about $5,200. Peru has roughly halved the poverty rate to just above 30% over the past decade.

But Mr. Humala's win is prompting some soul searching about the flaws in Peru's economic model, governing institutions and political elite. Analysts said Mr. Humala capitalized on the persistence of rural poverty, the broad distrust Peruvians feel towards traditional politicians and institutions and divisions within the centrist political establishment that kept it from settling on a single candidate to oppose Mr. Humala, who lost a prior presidential bid.
It was, to be sure, something of a surprise to Peruvian elites and observers of the country's political scene:
"For some observers, the idea of an Humala victory in 2011 was inconceivable," said Maxwell Cameron, a political scientist at University of British Columbia. "If he lost in 2006, surely he would win even fewer votes in 2011 after another five years of growth. However, he added, "It was precisely this overconfidence that led the center-right to fail to unify behind a single candidate with broad appeal." Moreover, "After five years of growth, prosperity remained unequally distributed and heavily concentrated in the coast and major cities..."

A paper written a few years ago by Julio Carrion, a political scientist at the University of Delaware, sums up the paradox in Peru between high growth and widespread public dissatisfaction. The title: "It isn't the Economy, Stupid. Economic Growth Does Not Reduce Political Discontent in Peru."

Poverty and inequality were accountable for part of the problem, he wrote, but not all of it. Another issue, he wrote, is Peruvians lack of faith in government and public officials. In a survey last year by Latinobarometro of Chile, Peruvians ranked the lowest of 19 nations in the region in their confidence, in Congress, political parties, and the courts. About one-fifth of the members of Peru's Congress have been caught up in scandals, by the count of a local newspaper...

Mr. Humala, a former military officer, cast himself as the anti-politician. He emerged in the public eye in 2000 when he led 60 troops in an uprising against Alberto Fujimori in an isolated mining town. The act was largely symbolic, but it catapulted Mr. Humala into prominence. Moving forward, [political consultant Hugo] Santa Maria told a conference call of investors that economic growth for the second half of 2011 could decline to 4% to 4.5% from around 7% due to investors' caution over Mr. Humala. "A slowing down of private investment...will slow down the economy," he said.
So, a previous Latin American high-flyer is in danger of stalling. Mining giants operating in the country are already thinking twice, for instance. Will Humala be a Lula de Silva (a former activist turned pro-investment figurehead; they apparently have lots of them in Brazil) or a Hugo Chavez (an erstwhile mentor of his)? It was not so long ago that Lula was regarded with healthy suspicion, yet he turned out to be quite progressive in trying to reconcile social activism with welcoming enterprise. Commentators suggest Humala has learned from his 2006 run when his Chavistic stylings scared off many voters, and that he now intends to be more Lula-like. (The stock market rebounded Tuesday.) His appointments for central bank governor and finance minister represent early opportunities to assuage fears.

Yet, it again begs the question about the foundational stability of rapid but unequal growth in LDCs. So many times you see trickle-down failing to do its thing despite reasonably healthy growth rates. It's certainly something for libertarians and their ilk to ponder.

But with all that comes a blessing of sorts: a side benefit of the Cold War ending is that Washington no longer sees the need to pull the strings in its backyard in fear of Soviets gaining a foothold in Latin America. Despite the appearance of various regimes casting a baleful eye towards Washington--we want to be self-sufficient, go away American imperialists, etc--the old will to meddle in this part of the world is not what it once was.

UPDATE: Markets are being further assuaged by credit rating agencies stating no downgrade is imminent, but geez, isn't it too soon to comment after such recent elections?

Sunday, May 15, 2011

Repairing the Adulterated IMF Post-Strauss-Kahn

I wonder what our colleagues at the Bretton Woods Project would make of this. Before going to sleep last night, I caught news that IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn was held in New York en route to France on attempted rape charges [1, 2]. Having written about the big kahuna's peccadilloes before, this latest episode will probably surprise Americans more than those of us in Europe who've become accustomed to these sorts of allegations against DSK. Yet, alike with the Monica Lewinsky allegations, the magnitude of these claims invites initial disbelief. This news story has even topped Yahoo! News. When the IMF only receives popular coverage when an event like this happens, you know that it has a problem with getting the public to understand what it does as well as with the kind of attention it receives. Pick your news outlet of choice: it may be a slow weekend, but DSK is front-page on nearly every one.

Much comment has already been made about the incident. While innocent until proven guilty is the operating principle, you can certainly argue that this incident has damaged DSK's credibility mortally. There are of course many implications here:
  1. His chances of being the Socialist Party standard-bearer for next year's French election against the UMP's Nicolas Sarkozy are now nugatory. Various polls have claimed that he led Sarkozy at various points in the run-up to 2012. Though he probably did not foresee the extent of it, offering DSK as IMF managing director was a Sarkozy masterstroke in neutralizing a potential rival on the domestic political scene. Segolene Royal partie deux, mon ami?
  2. In his place, American First Deputy Managing Director John Lipsky--formerly of JP Morgan and a securitization cheerleader in his earlier days [1, 2]--takes control. This certainly isn't the outcome most of us wishing for more diversity in IMF leadership want. However, this is mitigated by Lipsky indicating that he will step down at the end of August. Fancy that: a guy most clearly associated with promoting securitization prior to the crisis now has to deal with the fallout from their abuse and misuse.
  3. On the bright side, the unlikely return of DSK and the stopgap term of Lipsky will put to test IMF indications of reform (including from DSK himself) to make it reflect the world's changing centre of economic activity. Your truly will certainly hold it to account in choosing its next chief from a developing country instead of the unbroken tradition of having a European head and an American #2. Given the buildup in previous years, I can certainly assure you that developing countries will cause a ruckus if it doesn't happen this time around. All change at the top is long overdue.
  4. A non-European head would still come too late to limit IMF "mission creep." I have written on why the IMF should not bail out Greece, Ireland and Portugal since the primary causes of their crises were not balance-of-payments difficulties which the IMF was designed to address. Hopefully, an LDC chief would resist calls from rich Western countries to misallocate funds meant for aforementioned BOP crises--especially contributions from LDC members. If the EU wants to bail out its own, fine, but don't use monies set aside for other purposes at the IMF.
  5. DSK was already becoming antsy about Greece's similarly socialist leaders not living up to their end of the bargain. With this rapport now ended, the IMF's already limited powers of persuasion in keeping Greece in line will probably take another knock. Ironically, Sarkozy's efforts to keep EU bailouts a European affair will likely suffer a blow from his fiercest rival effectively discrediting himself via nasty entanglements. The IMF/EU/ECB troika with the possible exception of the ECB has taken its lumps. but is not terminally damaged to the point of not being able to work alongside each other.
Personal factors aside, IMF prescriptions will likely not change under whatever new leadership it will have in a couple of months. It may have eased somewhat on high neoliberal orthodoxy during his time in charge--especially when friends in high places rather than low places got in trouble--but conditionalities are still there that are quite harsh for the rest. Ask Greece. Still, one hopes that an LDC chief can signal a more truly cosmopolitan outlook for the organization in composition while returning to its core mission of handling BOP crises.

As for le grand seducteur, some people just want to party all the time. DSK is a socialist in the way Super Mario is a communist, and his hankering for the good life looks to have terminally ended his future political prospects. But hey, loving the limelight, he can always become an Eliot Spitzer-esque talking head.

UPDATE 1: The NYPD making DSK do the perp walk shows a good amount of confidence by the authorities in their case.

UPDATE 2: Yahoo! News now features three stories on the case. Is this a case of misplaced priorities or something else? You know something is up when the IMF shares top billing with the world's best known if deceased terrorist.

Tuesday, April 19, 2011

PM Cameron to Block Gordon Brown Heading IMF?

The House has noticed the Prime Minister’s remarkable transformation in the last few weeks from Stalin to Mr Bean...Creating chaos out of order rather than order out of chaos - then-UK Shadow Chancellor Vince Cable on Gordon Brown in November 2007

Poor Gordon Brown. During the early years of New Labour, he was widely considered a master of public financial management. He famously coined the so-called golden rule of fiscal policy that over the economic cycle, the UK will borrow only to invest and not to fund current spending. In other words, net borrowing must be close to zero during an economic cycle. Of course, many pounced on this notion as problematic. How do you define an "economic cycle" being the most obvious question left unanswered.

The global financial crisis put paid to the golden rule rhetoric in a way that the later Blair years were already beginning to hint at. Tight-fisted control of the public purse? You must be joking. It's Brown's misfortune to come into office when a dramatic deterioration of public finances due to bailouts, eroded revenues, etc. began to take their toll. However, while Gordon Brown's reputation lies in tatters here in Britain, he may still be better received in Washington among the global financial elite. After once being mooted to be an IMF managing director, he still has not formally said "no" to the idea.

In the past day on the BBC's Today radio programme, current PM David Cameron was asked if he would endorse Gordon Brown as the next IMF managing director given that its current head, Domonique Strauss-Kahn (DSK), is widely believed to be heading home to France next year to be the Socialist Party's standard bearer against Nicolas Sarkozy.

I made a post sometime ago--Stupid European Tricks, I called it--on how this system works in Europe. Leaders here are often keen on allowing rivals from other parties to gain key posts in international institutions, thereby removing them from domestic politics. Think of Silvio "Bunga Bunga" Berlusconi allowing Romano Prodi to become the EU commissioner. Or, think of Nicolas Sarkozy encouraging the aforementioned DSK to become the IMF managing director.

Given that Gordon Brown is pretty much a spent force in the UK, we actually have PM Cameron discouraging the idea of Brown heading to Washington (not that he asked for it, but anyway.) With Brown more or less silent on the Westminster scene, there is no benefit for Cameron in giving a former rival a chance to rehabilitate his reputation elsewhere. Churlish? You decide. From the Evening Standard:
Gordon Brown's hopes of heading the International Monetary Fund were dealt a serious blow as David Cameron indicated he was ready to block his predecessor's appointment to the role. The Prime Minister said Mr Brown was not the "most appropriate person" to take over as managing director of the IMF because he failed to understand the dangers of excessive debt.

His intervention raised the prospect of a UK veto amid heightened speculation that Mr Brown is emerging as a leading contender to take over from Dominique Strauss-Kahn who is deciding whether to be the socialist candidate in the French presidential elections next year...

But, asked whether he would veto the move, Mr Cameron said: "I haven't spent a huge amount of time thinking about this but it does seem to me that, if you have someone who didn't think we had a debt problem in the UK when we self-evidently do have a debt problem, then they might not be the most appropriate person to work out whether other countries around the world have debt and deficit problems."
Encouragingly, Cameron is aware of the world economy's changing centre of gravity and says it's time we broke with the convention of choosing a European to head the IMF (and an American to do the same for the World Bank?):
Speaking on BBC Radio 4, the Prime Minister suggested that the IMF should look to "another part of the world" for its next leader in order to increase its global standing...If you think about the general principle, you've got the rise of India and China and South Asia, a shift in the world's focus, and it may well be the time for the IMF to start thinking about that shift in focus," he said.

"Above all what matters is: is the person running the IMF someone who understands the dangers of excessive debt, excessive deficit? And it really must be someone who gets that rather than someone who says that they don't see a problem."
To be sure, the Bretton Woods institutions have backed away from strict neoliberal strictures on fiscal prudence when the financial centres they came from went astray. Review IMF Chief Economist Olivier Blanchard when rich countries instead of poor countries ran into trouble during the global financial crisis. You know the excuses: their margin of error is higher, markets are more forgiving of them, their status as reserve currency issuing countries helps, the balance of risks today is different, etc.

So, in a post-crisis IMF, Brown's later American-style spending spree and implicit deficit denial may not be entirely out of place. Then again, how would you push the austerity message on others given his track record? At any rate, the FT avers that Brown is not even one of the top candidates for the predicted IMF job opening [1, 2] but a host of other European financial bigwigs. Christine Legarde? Too many French in international institutions IMHO.

It's too speculative for me at the moment, and I for one would fully endorse an LDC successor to DSK wholeheartedly. We can all hope, eh?

UPDATE: An audio clip of the interview is available from Auntie.

Monday, February 7, 2011

Robert Wade on De-Neoliberalizing the World Bank

Here's yet another interesting article from the new LSE house journal Global Policy. It all started in the second issue of this publication when Robert Wade, a famously "heterodox" economist in our development department, envisioned post-crisis options for developing states. In particular, he mentioned possibilities for something the World Bank has long disdained--industrial policy--correcting the belief that markets are self-obviously superior to states in such areas as disseminating information, determining prices, and allocating resources.

Well, the global financial crisis seems to have broken faith in these "neoliberal" beliefs. After all, a characteristically hypocritical North American nation fond of preaching the gospel of deregulation, liberalization, and privatization as the keys to economic heaven for errant developing countries suddenly began an unprecedented regime of reregulation (of financial services providers), deliberalization (of securities trading), and nationalization (of automakers and banks) when faced with its own crisis. Who's got "national champions" now, white man? Your industrial policy looks a lot like ours--but is far more encompassing in scale and scope. The picture to the right is the Storm Thorgerson-designed cover of Mars Volta's De-Loused in the Comatorium. While not my favourite listen, it may be an apt metaphor for what's happening with the excesses of neoliberalism--delousing subprime globalization as the Washington Consensus is left for dead.

It should thus be mentioned that no small amount of gloating has also emerged from those like Robert Wade and Ha-Joon Chang who've long argued for a more active role for states. To make a long story short, Justin Lin--the first non-G7 chief economist at the World Bank--did not disagree as much as you'd expect with Wade in his succeeding article in Global Policy. Rather, Lin had qualifiers on the extent to which industrial policy should be practised and under what circumstances. In turn, Wade has just issued his comment on Lin's reply. While it's true that the World Bank now has less influence over developing countries--again, many receive much more in the form of workers' remittances than official development aid provided by institutions like the Bank--its relaxation of a hardline market approach as represented by Lin's softer position represents a gradual meeting of minds according to Wade:
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Here are a few directions in which some vigorous pushing is needed, whether by the World Bank or others. First, on the supply side, is the distinction between ‘existing comparative advantage’ and ‘future’ or ‘latent’ or ‘dynamic’ comparative advantage. Most of the time Lin wishes to limit ‘interventions’ to helping firms exploit the opportunities offered in the existing comparative advantage – with the qualification that ‘economic development is a dynamic process that requires industrial upgrading’, a dynamic process that may change the existing comparative advantage and in which the government may have an important coordinating role. I wonder how to operationalize the distinction between existing and latent comparative advantage. Lin suggests that government and firms in country X should scrutinize the kinds of products and services produced in comparably endowed countries with per capita incomes roughly double X’s, and look for promising items or processes within this set. Indeed, Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese planners did do a lot of this ‘looking ahead down the river’ kind of exercise. But they often took target countries much more than twice as rich as they were at the time. And today, more than when the capitalist East Asians went through their fast-growth decades, there is more ‘vertical’ differentiation in the production of any one product, creating niches in the production of final products which, as final products, appear to be far beyond the ‘latent’ comparative advantage of country X (see my Governing the Market (Wade, 2004)).

This line of thinking invites serious attention to the rather neglected subject of industrial upgrading and diversification, including to the concept of stages of growth. It is remarkable how ideas about the transition from resource-based industries (for example, textiles and apparel) to heavy and chemical industries, to scale-sensitive assembly-based industries like automobiles and electronics, to Internet-based industries (all with very different appropriate roles of government) have largely disappeared from development economics. Here it is worth going back to the seminal work of the Japanese economist Akamatsu and his flying-geese theory of intra-industry evolution within one national economy and linked flying-geese theory of inter-country evolution in a hierarchical division of labor. Akamatsu published his main work before the Second World War. There is no better place to understand his arguments and see their application to development patterns of the past several decades than Terutomo Ozawa’s important new book, The Rise of Asia: The ‘Flying-Geese’ Theory of Tandem Growth and Regional Agglomeration (2009). Much of Lin’s thinking resonates with that of Akamatsu and Ozawa.

Another big hole in conventional development economics, which Lin and the World Bank could help to give more attention to, is on the demand side – above all, the tendency for wages to increase more slowly than productivity growth, which limits domestic demand and concentrates income and wealth at the top, distorting the economy by the efforts of the wealth holders to find ways to store their wealth (in natural resources, complex financial products, overseas bank accounts, political patronage). The World Bank could give its support to Rooseveltian measures like a legal minimum wage, cash transfers to the poor and guaranteed public sector employment at the minimum wage. The trouble is that its [Country Policy and Institutional Assessment] formula hard-wires in the assumption that a completely free, ‘undistorted’ labor market with virtually no worker protections is the ideal labor market for development. This needs to change.

A third – and for present purposes final – big hole in conventional development economics concerns the strong advantages of mobilizing domestic savings, as distinct from relying on foreign borrowing. For too long economists have presumed that foreign saving will help to raise domestic investment, downplaying its dangers – a presumption indirectly derived from the interests of western financial firms. No one was more adamant – and one eyed – about the need for free capital flows and for developing countries to borrow abroad to supplement domestic savings than Larry Summers, during and after his tenure as chief economist of the World Bank. One of the most eloquent arguments about the need for and methods for boosting domestic savings is set out by the Brazilian economist Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, in Globalization and Competition: Why Some Emergent Countries Succeed while Others Fall Behind (2010).
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IMHO, the intellectual terrain has shifted from "Should countries be allowed to use industrial policy?" to "How can industrial policy be gainfully applied?" While I still have some trouble with some of Wade's ideas (and Chang's for that matter), let's say we agree that Larry Summers is...not so great. Still, I'd certainly like to see examples other than Asian tigers being cited. If industrial policy can be made to work, then certainly there are other countries who've applied it to good effect, right?

Wednesday, January 5, 2011

Singaporean PM Lee: PRC Revaluation a Win-Win

Well here's an interesting news item: China's model of authoritarian development is said to be based on the example of Singapore [1, 2]. Whereas Deng Xiaoping's predecessors always derided the minuscule nation-state as some sort of degenerate capitalist roader, his game-changing visit there in the late 1970s is often said to be a turning point. Not only did official commentary cease deriding Singapore, but Deng Xiaoping's eyes were opened as to how far behind China had fallen and how it could move ahead without really going the proto-neoliberal route.

As you know, the rest is history. Singapore's guiding light, Lee Kuan Yew, always spoke highly of Deng Xiaoping after that as the latter began to talk about the colour of the cat not mattering as long as it caught mice. Fast-forward a couple of decades and we have a different situation: Lee Hsien Loong, the son of Lee Kuan Yew, is now the prime minister of Singapore. Meanwhile, the Chinese leadership has gone through regularly scheduled changes culminating in the current Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao combination. Also, China is more than flush with foreign exchange as I'm sure you've noticed.

Hence, another Mr. Lee from Singapore is trying to advise China on what it should do with its currency, the renminbi. Instead of listening to (often hypocritical) white people telling the Chinese what to do all the time, perhaps hearing the same idea from the leaders of Singapore will actually register, right? At any rate, here is your guided tour of the world economy care of Lee Hsien Loong's commentary:
The most consequential relationship in the world today is between the U.S. and China. There has been significant friction, notably over exchange rates. The yuan issue is politically hard -- the U.S. sees an undervalued Chinese currency as unfair competition, while China fears that sharp revaluation will disrupt its economy, causing unemployment and unrest.

But from an economic point of view, this needn’t be a win- lose battle. A gradually appreciating yuan will encourage Chinese export industries to restructure and upgrade, help distribute the gains from growth more broadly beyond exports to the rest of the economy, and mitigate inflation, which is a growing problem in China. At the same time, it will help ease political pressures in the U.S. and tensions in the relationship.

The Chinese are aware of foreign perceptions that with growing strength it has become more assertive. China’s leaders have emphasized that the country is committed to peaceful development and has no aggressive intentions. China’s domestic challenges are numerous and daunting. Its government must uplift hundreds of millions who remain in poverty, create social safety nets for its people, moderate major disparities in wealth and development, and maintain social and political stability so that progress can continue...

No less than the U.S. or other democracies, China has its own domestic politics that it can’t ignore. China’s leaders need to explain this reality, and their basic thinking, convincingly to international audiences, who see Beijing and Shanghai and think that is China. But countries will also watch China’s actions -- how it conducts itself on international issues such as climate change, and what the leaders say to their own people on China’s role in the world.

As world economies recover, governments must continue promoting global trade, to deepen the international division of labor and foster long-term prosperity for all. More immediately, the win-win results of freer trade will give a badly needed boost to demand and growth. During the crisis, protectionist pressures were a real worry. Fortunately, governments took fewer protectionist and retaliatory actions than many feared, but they also made very few positive trade moves.

In the U.S., there is little political appetite for free trade; hence the slow progress of its bilateral Free Trade Agreements and the World Trade Organization’s Doha Round. But there are some recent positive developments. The renegotiated free-trade agreement between South Korea and the U.S. was settled recently, though not yet ratified. The U.S. is also one of nine Asia-Pacific countries negotiating a Trans-Pacific partnership, which will be a pathway toward the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation’s vision of a free-trade area of the Asia- Pacific region.
As usual, it's smart, observant talk from the leaders of Singapore--a country that others listen to because, well, it actually works. I can't say that others lend the same ear to a certain North American country that loves telling others what to do despite falling apart economically, politically, and socially, but I'll save that refrain for another time.

Lastly, one shouldn't lose sight of the fact that, as a country in export competition with the PRC in quite a number of areas, Singapore would undoubtedly benefit from yuan revaluation.

Monday, December 6, 2010

World Bank's Lin on Post-Crisis Industrial Policy

A few months back I featured Robert Wade's article in Global Policy concerning the prospects of industrial policy post-crisis. Yes, it was a bit of triumphalism about the follies of blind obeisance to American neoliberal diktat circa 1997. However, time moves on. World Bank Chief Economist Justin Yifu Lin has a new response in the same journal to Wade that takes (surprise!) issue with some of the latter's assertions, especially scepticism about the worth of neoclassical economics as well as the role of the market vis-a-vis that of the state. Let's just say Lin is more sanguine on neoclassical economics and the market as an engine of economic growth. Although Lin takes a somewhat softer line towards heterodox economics championed by Wade et al., let's just say this detente has limitations:
I do not share Wade’s severe assessment of neoclassical economics on two points. First, despite the absence of convergence among world economies, the progress made by developing countries in recent decades cannot be underestimated. The fact that the majority of states have remained in the same income category over two decades may be the reflection of general progress (a tide-lifting-all-boats phenomenon) rather than a sign of general stagnation. Although relative incomes among various groups of countries may not have changed much, the absolute levels of incomes have increased steadily in recent decades. This has contributed substantially to the reduction of world poverty (Ravallion and Chen, 2008). Clearly, an open world economy has offered opportunities for many developing countries throughout the world to achieve sustained growth and improve their living standards (Growth Commission, 2008). This is true even in many countries that have not moved up the convergence ladder.

Second, the market is an important resource allocation mechanism at any given level of development. Economic growth occurs when firms are given the incentive system to take advantage of existing opportunities determined by the country’s endowment structure. They can also create potential new business niches by identifying and exploiting the economy’s latent comparative advantage. They spontaneously enter industries and choose technologies consistent with the economy’s comparative advantage only when the price system reflects the relative scarcity of factors in the country’s endowment. Therefore, a competitive market system should be the economy’s fundamental mechanism for resource allocation at each stage of its development. However, economic development is a dynamic process that requires industrial upgrading and corresponding improvements in ‘hard’ (tangible) and ‘soft’ (intangible) infrastructure at each stage. Such upgrading requires coordination and entails large externalities to firms’ transaction costs and returns to capital investment. Thus, in addition to an effective market mechanism, the government should play an active role in facilitating industrial upgrading and infrastructure improvements.
And here is Lin's assessment of what industrial policy can do for development. To no one's real surprise, he does not afford it the commanding heights and instead gives it a more limited role:
A framework for conceptualizing the facilitating role of the government in industrial upgrading and economic diversification could involve a six-step process as follows. (1) Developing country governments can identify the list of tradable goods and services that have been produced for about 20 years in dynamically growing countries with similar endowment structures and a per capita income that is about 100 per cent higher than their own. (2) Among the industries in that list, the government may give priority to those in which some domestic private firms have already entered spontaneously, and try to identify and help remove the obstacles to their development. (3) Some of those industries in the list may be completely new to domestic firms; in such cases, the government could adopt specific measures to attract firms in the higher-income countries identified in the first step to invest in these industries. (4) Developing country governments should pay close attention to private enterprises’ successful self-discoveries of industries that are not included in the list identified in step (1) and provide support to scale up those industries. (5) In developing countries with poor infrastructure and an unfriendly business environment, the government can invest in industrial parks or export processing zones and make the necessary improvements to attract domestic private firms and/or foreign firms that may be willing to invest in the targeted industries. Finally (6) limited incentives may also be provided to domestic pioneer firms or foreign investors that work within the list of industries identified in step (1) in order to compensate for the non-rival, public knowledge created by their investments.
Also, don't miss my previous post on Lin debating with Ha-Joon Chang in the pages of the Development Policy Review. For those really into the topic, there's also a longer World Bank working paper co-authored by Lin on "Growth identification and facilitation : the role of the state in the dynamics of structural change." Happy reading! States and markets...the debate continues.

Wednesday, November 24, 2010

IIE's Williamson: There Is No 'Beijing Consensus'

Whether he's found the attention for doing so welcome or not, John Williamson should be familiar to all concerned as the fellow who coined the "Washington Consensus." Although he takes issue with those who identify it with the most extreme forms of liberalization, deregulation, and privatization instead of moderation he says he championed, the label has stuck for better or worse as consonant with neoliberal thought.

Likewise, the "Beijing Consensus" is widely misunderstood. As Williamson correctly notes, no Chinese authors have claimed the term for themselves. Rather, it was an American journalist, Joshua Cooper Ramo, who came up with the term and its original, factually challenged description of what was happening in Chinese policy circles aside from the bit on experimentation and gradualism. Since then, it's taken the form of whatever Westerners believe is going on in China--authoritarianism and a state-led political economy most of all. As you would expect, Williamson takes as dim a view of what others consider the Beijing Consensus as of what they have made of the Washington Consensus. Recently, he had this to say in a recent interview:
John Williamson: Yes. Let me make it clear that I don’t think that the Washington Consensus was advanced as a set of ideal propositions about the ways to develop. It was what I sensed in 1989 as a consensus around town about the type of policies that need to be followed in Latin American countries as of that particular date. That’s not to say that it’s comprehensive or neutral. There certainly are other things that I would want to include about the right ways to develop, and some of the things that have been attributed to Washington Consensus I regard as simply erroneous, but that’s another question.

Steve Weisman: What do you think of the idea of a Beijing Consensus? What would be its main principles?

John Williamson: The interesting thing is that most people who are simply talking about it seem to be non-Chinese. They are very much foreigners and intruding on the Chinese debate, and they’ve tried to suggest that there is this consensus, which many in developing countries are looking to now as the right way to develop [my emphasis]. In a lecture [that] I delivered in Birmingham, I tend to take a somewhat cynical view about that. I argued first of all that there’s not a lot of content in the concept of the Beijing Consensus beyond saying, “This is what the Chinese do.” There’s no list of propositions [comparable] to those [that] I suggest constituted the Washington Consensus. Instead it’s what China does, and I’ve identified four things.

First of all, I said that China was certainly committed to feeling the stones across the river instead of doing things in one big leap. By that, they mean that they adopt an experimental approach to things and see what works and try things one at a time, rather than committing everything on one absolute theory. That seems to me a sensible enough approach if one’s in a position to do it.

Secondly, I think that it’s a very experimental approach [that] they are committed to. I think also one can argue [it is] a good thing although it can be taken too far. I do argue in this paper that there were times when one shouldn’t forget that they’re still a developing country and it really probably isn’t a good use of resources to be always reinventing the wheel rather than to accept that other people have already invented the wheel, and therefore, to devote resources to exploiting these innovations.

The third thing is that they still have many state firms and that they clearly are floating within a capitalist framework. Let’s just say they regard prices as the essential mechanism by which they allocate resources, but they have many state firms and they haven’t completely embraced the advice to privatize everything. Now, one is faced with asking the question: Should that be regarded as a great plus for China? It is regarded in many outside countries, I think, as a big plus for them. But it may be that the Chinese themselves feel that they, in fact, got more [from] liberalizing the economy since they got out of the fact that the process of liberalization is not yet complete. And maybe one needs a more balanced perspective than the tendency in the literature to espouse.

I think the fourth element of Chinese policy is continuing fascination with authoritarianism. I mean, one can’t say that China is a great example of democracy. True that [Premier] Wen Jiabao has been giving speeches recently in which he espouses this principle. But China has not been noted for its attempt to espouse democracy in its relations with other countries. Instead it’s accepted that countries are entitled to do as they please. It’s really pushing the doctrine of national sovereignty very hard indeed, and one may have reservations about that. So, on the whole, I don’t think that this Beijing Consensus, at best I’ve been able to formulate it, is the right way to go.
And of course there's now the Seoul Consensus [1, 2] to deal with that would be more factual by Williamson's definition insofar as South Korea actually came up with it as the current G-20 chair. The Beijing Consensus is so 2004, dahling.

Tuesday, October 26, 2010

Ha-Joon Chang Bids Capital Controls Farewell

And so the death knell for Washington Consensus-style policies tolls even louder. While it's certainly debatable whether the excesses of liberalization, deregulation, and privatization helped bring about the current US-led subprime globalization mess, there are undeniable signs that laissez-faire has had its day as Gordon Brown once said. First, the architect of many such efforts stateside, the archetypal ugly American Larry Summers, is soon to exit the White House. Whether he went or was pushed is quite immaterial; the bigger point is that no one seems to be lamenting his demise. Second, current IMF leadership embodied by Dominique Strauss-Kahn is not so fond either of the Asian crisis-era Washington Consensus. Third, the IMF is even warming up to the use of capital controls--albeit in specific situations--which it once thought of as the work of the devil.

Welcome to the brave new world, then. As always, that champion of heterodox economics, Ha-Joon Chang, is heralding the demise of these once-fearsome policy prescriptions used to open up developing countries to the will of global capital (or something like that). Here he is together with Ilene Grabel of the University of Denver on why FDI still goes on irrespective of capital controls being implemented:
Was it really just a decade ago that the International Monetary Fund and investors howled when Malaysia imposed capital controls in response to the then looming Asian financial crisis? We ask because suddenly those times seem so distant. Today, the IMF is not just sitting on its hands as country after country resurrects capital controls, but is actually going so far as to promote their use [see third point above]. What about the investors whose freedoms are eclipsed by the new controls? Well, their enthusiasm for foreign lending and investing has not been damped in the least. So what is going on here? In our view, nothing short of the most significant transformation in global financial management of the past 30 years.

Like most transformations, this reform has been gradual. Reform in the IMF view of capital controls actually began soon after the Asian crisis, as countries such as Chile, China and India imposed controls. Most analysts found that these controls were beneficial in key respects. This success led the IMF to soften its hardline stance: it admitted that controls might be tolerable in exceptional cases provided that they were temporary, market friendly and focused strictly on capital inflows. That said, policymakers adopted capital controls at their peril – not least risking condemnation by the Fund and by credit rating agencies, and punishment by international investors.

What was just a trickle of controls before the current crisis is now a flood. Iceland led the way in 2008 as it grappled with its financial implosion. Soon after, a parade of developing countries took action: some strengthened existing controls while others introduced new measures that targeted inflows and outflows. For example, during the crisis China augmented its extensive array of controls, while Indonesia, Taiwan, Peru, Argentina, Ecuador, Ukraine, Russia and Venezuela also introduced controls of one sort or another. In October 2010 alone: Brazil twice raised its tax on foreign investment in fixed-income bonds while leaving foreign direct investment untaxed; Thailand introduced a 15 per cent withholding tax on capital gains and interest payments on foreign holdings of government and state-owned company bonds; and South Korean regulators have begun to audit lenders utilising foreign currency derivatives.

The IMF did not drive this process of reform, but its staff have adjusted their thinking quickly in response to the exigencies of the crisis. One of these is the unforeseen currency appreciation in many developing countries that is a consequence of capital flight from the dismal returns now on offer in wealthy countries [pace "international currency war"]. Many recent Fund reports make clear that capital controls are a legitimate part of the policy toolkit. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the IMF’s managing director, said as much in his recent speech in Shanghai, while the director of the Fund’s western hemispheric department made a case (unsuccessfully) for the use of controls in Colombia in response to the rapid appreciation of its currency. Not your grandfather’s IMF, to be sure...

What was forgotten during the neo-liberal era is that many of these explicitly “anti-market” measures helped to promote rapid economic development by increasing financial stability. This is not to say that all controls were successful or that all measures taken to enforce them were appropriate. But that should not distract us from acknowledging their tremendous contributions to unprecedented economic growth and stability during the period.

Those of us who have long advocated systematic financial reform look at current developments with excitement. Countries need the latitude to impose capital controls that meet their particular needs, and it is a relief to see that they are finally getting it after a long period of debilitating neoliberal ideology.
Though I have my differences with Ha-Joon Chang, I certainly believe capital controls can and should be a matter of national policy space instead of being forbidden by IMF diktat, AKA conditionalities.

Wednesday, October 6, 2010

PM Cameron: There is Such a Thing as Big Society

The place of society in the wider public sphere is one of the key battlegrounds of political economy as The Commanding Heights usefully points out. Back in 1987, Margaret Thatcher crystallized the ethos of the age by stating "there is no such thing as society":
I think we have gone through a period when too many children and people have been given to understand "I have a problem, it is the Government's job to cope with it!" or "I have a problem, I will go and get a grant to cope with it!" "I am homeless, the Government must house me!" and so they are casting their problems on society and who is society? There is no such thing! There are individual men and women and there are families and no government can do anything except through people and people look to themselves first.
After thirteen years in the wilderness, the Conservatives have returned to government in tandem with some Liberal Democratic colleagues. While disowning some of the more right-leaning extremes of Thatcherite ideology, the idea that government needs to be rolled back has a new emphasis. The point of rolling back the frontiers of the state is not mainly because there are so many sponging on the state (see above), but because there are many in the private and third sectors who are more able to deliver social services. It's a neat cop-out on the states-markets debate.

Voila! The "Big Society" idea--long bandied about in Conservative manifestos--has now emerged on centre stage during the Tory conference in Birmingham. Before turning to that, a recent publication lays out its main idea--sharing and caring without massive government expenditures:
We want to give citizens, communities and local government the power and information they need to come together, solve the problems they face and build the Britain they want. We want society – the families, networks, neighbourhoods and communities that form the fabric of so much of our everyday lives – to be bigger and stronger than ever before. Only when people and communities are given more power and take more responsibility can we achieve fairness and opportunity for all.

Building this Big Society isn’t just the responsibility of just one or two departments. It is the responsibility of every department of Government, and the responsibility of every citizen too. Government on its own cannot fix every problem. We are all in this together. We need to draw on the skills and expertise of people across the country as we respond to the social, political and economic challenges Britain faces.
Hence Cameron's new tagline, "Your Country Needs You" which echoes WWII-era rhetoric. Mostly shorn of Hayekian elements, here are the key elements of his new speech on the "Big Society Spirit":
It's the spirit that I saw in a group of NHS maternity nurses in my own constituency, increasingly frustrated by the way they were managed and handled, who wanted to set up a co-op to use their own expertise, their ideas, their contacts to provide a better serice for the mums in their area.

It's the spirit you see just down the road from this conference in Balsall Heath, where local residents' were fed up with the pimps and the prostitutes and the gangs and the drug dealers. So they set up street patrols to clear them out of the area and turn what was a no-go zone into a desirable place to live

It's the spirit that just today, has seen some of our leading social organisations come together to set up a new Citizen's University, to help give people the skills they need to play a bigger part in our society. It's the spirit of activism, dynamism, people taking the initiative, working together to get things done.

It's the spirit that has inspired the conference this week as you've heard from teachers and counsellors with a passion for what you do. Seeing our activists building community centres down the road in Allan Rock or on the other side of the world in Rwanda, it's the social activism that spirit that drives our country today...

But what I'm talking about, the spirit that we need, is the big society spirit - and here's why I think its time has come. All over the world, governments are wrestling with the same challenges. Not just building prosperous, competitive economies, providing good public services, paying for pensions but creating strong societies, improving quality of life, ensuring everyone feels that they belong.

The countries that succeed will be those that find new ways of doing things, new ways of harnessing the common good, better alternatives to the old-fashioned state and we're on the right side of that argument.

Here at home, at this year's election, the result may not have been clear-cut when it came to the political parties. But it was clear cut enough when it came to political ideas. The old way of doing things: the high-spending, all-controlling, heavy-handed state, those ideas were defeated. Statism lost...society won [my emphasis].

That is what happened at the last election and that is the change I believe we can lead. From state power to people power. From unchecked individualism to national unity and purpose. From big government to the big society. The big society is not about creating cover for cuts. I was going on about it years before the cuts.

It's not about government abdicating its role, it is about government changing its role. It's about government helping to build a nation of doers and go-getters, where people step forward not sit back, where people come together to make life better...

We can build a country defined not by the selfishness of the Labour years but by the values of mutual responsibility that this party holds dear. A country defined not by what we consume but by what we contribute. A country, a society where we say: I am not alone. I will play my part. I will work with others to give Britain a brand new start.
To be honest, the United Kingdom is in pretty sorry shape. I will of course attribute this condition to following the US example rather slavishly in Anglo-Saxon mimesis. So fat, so inequitable, so full of debt and financial folly, so prone to waylaying you into ill-planned military misadventures. Among other things, the Birmingham conference featured a 2015 termination date for the UK's Afghanistan involvement. Hopefully, the "Big Society" idea if nothing else will mean the UK establishing a worthwhile identity for itself instead of copying such a sad, bad example. American whingeing sickens us all.

Wednesday, July 14, 2010

The IMF Sucks Up to Asia...

...because that's where the money is. Above is Korean PM Lee Myung-Bak welcoming IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn to his country. Now here's another story most of the whitebread commentariat has missed, but that's unsurprising. However, they perhaps ought to pay more attention for it may be Asia that rescues their behinds from the fiscal morass they're digging themselves in. It's only natural that with most of the Western world in sorry fiscal shape, the IMF is calling on Asia to play a larger role in global economic governance. In plain English, that's called "rattling the begging bowl in Asia."

Not so long ago if you remember, Korea was forced to resort to IMF emergency lending during the Asian financial crisis. Although it has since gone soft on hardcore Washington Consensus-style prescriptions of liberalization, privatization, and deregulation, the IMF did indeed prescribe the lot for South Korea. Not that it was necessarily popular or successful with even current IMF leadership spurning high neoliberal ideology, but there are good reasons a somewhat reinvented IMF wants to make amends. (Remember, its managing director has always been from old Europe, while its first deputy managing director from the US.)

In the meantime, how the world has changed! Now flush with reserves--more than a quarter of a trillion dollars--South Korea is not only the current chair of the G20 but an economic force to be reckoned with. Instead of being dictated terms to by the Washington-based institution, the IMF crew has set up shop in Korea to try and woo the favour of South Korea and other Asian nations. Yes, it's quite apologetic now for the misery it inflicted. From the IMF website comes news of the recently concluded conference in Daejon, South Korea:
Wrapping up a two-day conference on Asia’s future, IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn announced a set of commitments, labeled the “Daejeon Deliverables,” that he said will significantly strengthen the Asia-IMF partnership in a year that South Korea chairs the Group of Twenty (G-20).

Acknowledging that the IMF’s relationship with Asia had been damaged during the 1997–98 Asian crisis, Strauss-Kahn said the IMF had changed and learned important lessons that had helped the 187-member global institution tackle the recent global economic crisis better. “This conference has been an opportunity for the IMF to begin the process of stepping up its engagement with Asia,” said Il SaKong, chairman of Korea’s G-20 summit presidential committee. More than 1,000 regional economists, bankers, analysts, and financial media crowded into the Korean city of Daejeon for the conference, titled “Asia 21: Leading the Way Forward,” hosted by the Korean government and the IMF.
And here are the new IMF pledges of support:
At a concluding press conference, Strauss-Kahn made three key commitments to Asia, which is leading the world out of the recession caused by the global financial crisis, but which now faces challenges from large capital inflows that may trigger economic overheating.

• The IMF will work to make its analysis more useful and available to Asian members. This includes strengthening the IMF’s early warning systems, sharpening its focus on cross-border spillovers, and increasing work on cross-cutting themes, including macrofinancial linkages. It committed to a more even-handed approach to its surveillance of economies around the world.

• The IMF will work to strengthen the global financial safety net. To do so, the Fund will work closely with Asia—through Korea’s leadership on this issue in the G-20. The IMF is examining several options to strengthen its tools to help prevent crises and mitigate systemic shocks, including more tailored crisis prevention facilities and multi-country approaches.

• The IMF will support the further strengthening of Asia’s role and voice in the global economy. This can be done, first of all, by building on the package of 2008 IMF reforms which boosted Asia’s voting power in the Fund. The IMF is working on a second stage to be completed by the G-20 summit in Seoul in November. In addition, the Fund will strengthen its collaboration with regional organizations in Asia—and, as a first step, Asia will be represented at a major meeting on this issue that the IMF is organizing in October 2010.

Strauss-Kahn said he wanted to make Asia feel at home at the IMF and become more involved in global solutions. For Asia’s low-income countries, Strauss-Kahn noted they have the potential to become the next generation of emerging markets. Delegates also focused on continued inequality in Asia, despite the growing prosperity, with the IMF Managing Director talking about inclusive growth.
The cynic in me thinks all this (revisionist) lovey-dovey stuff has something to do with the IMF attempting to fundraise 250 billion euros out of the 750 billion euro bailout package for ailing EU member states. As yet, there have been no concrete details provided of where these proposed IMF monies will come from.

There's even a new factsheet where the IMF issues more apologies for its handling of the Asian financial crisis along with talk about less draconian conditionalities and more social prioritization. Here's the key text:
The IMF learned important lessons from the Asian crisis. In particular, the Fund recognizes that while tough measures are needed to address deep economic problems, the conditions accompanying its programs need to be more focused on the problems at hand, and it needs to be more conscious of the social impact of those programs. The IMF has sought to apply this and other lessons to its more recent lending programs. The example of Asia’s resilience during the current crisis and the examples of good practice from the region have helped inform IMF advice to other member countries.
Ultimately, the IMF may have more to gain from Asia than the other way round. With the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) in full swing and quite possibly forming the basis of a regional IMF, Asia has no real problems going it alone. Yet somewhat obviously, the IMF welcomes more funding from Asia--even to fight fires in the developed world. Neoliberalism, we hardly knew ye.

Sunday, June 27, 2010

Ordo- v Neoliberal: Why Germany Clobbers England

We hoped for the best, but things turned out like they always do - Viktor Chernomyrdin

And so England's overtattooed players from overindebted teams are going home early, joining their equally underwhelming fellow Anglo-Saxons the Americans after a 4-1 drubbing at the hands of Germany. (Heck, the English didn't even play body art poster boy David Beckham due to injury.) Not that this result is of any surprise to me as I've intoned before, but the magnitude of the defeat is especially disheartening for those who thought England would've been less embarrassing.

Where does this chronic performance deficit come from? Most visibly, it is illustrated in the first divisions of the respective countries. The UK's higher propensity to pay massive, financially unsustainable wage bills on experienced (especially foreign) players tends to crowd out national player development. By contrast, German leagues have not been as marked by as much overspending, Certainly, German teams do not win as many Champions League or UEFA Cup titles as their free-spending English brethren, but when the world's biggest tournament comes around when you can't throw as much good money after bad, the country whose league nurtures home players fares better.

The rot in the English system starts early. To set the stage for today's thrashing, recall the 2009 U-21 event in which Germany beat England 4-0 featuring prominently, like today, the menacing Mesut Ozil. As you know, many other young'uns from that German side played today:
This victory, so deserved the rather ugly trophy could almost have been handed over by Uefa president Michel Platini at half-time, leaves the Germans as European champions at Under-17, Under-19 and now Under-21 level, reminding the Football Association of the importance of cranking up the production line of young talent...

England need to nurture such match-winners, players who are about more than athleticism and hard work. “He’s an outstanding player, who takes up intelligent positions,’’ [England U-21 Coach Stuart] Pearce said of Ozil. Germany’s coach, Horst Hrubesch, said: “This win shows that the great cooperation between the German FA and the smaller federations, and the clubs and the Bundesliga, is being repaid right now with the tremendous young players we have.’’
So yes, they have a system of player development which works well in Germany, with a long line of promising players at every single age level and just entering the Bundesliga. By contrast the UK World Cup team is pretty much geezerized, with several "golden generation" individuals representing the oldest England team ever and the most senior in the competition even without Beckham. Why is this so? First, there is a tendency to give megabucks to those who've done their best in other leagues like Michael Ballack. He was already fairly advanced in age when Chelsea picked him up. Next, these aging stars block the career progression of younger players. Not only have England's younger players been beaten already by Germany's during youth competition, but their disadvantage is further widened since the English don't get as much experience as Deutschland's kids playing first division football.

And here's the coup de grace: the Bundesliga is better attended and more profitable than the no-holds-barred spending competition in the Premier League featuring, among others, oligarch Roman Abramovich (Chelsea) and the Emiratis (Manchester City). Cost control in the Premier League? To hell with that German idea; it's the "sugar daddy" model in excelsis:
The Bundesliga recorded a £146m profit as revenue increased by £116m and wages went up by just £68m, according to Deloitte’s Annual Review of Football Finance. The German first division also recorded the highest attendances in Europe for the seventh successive season – attracting 8,000 more people per game than the Premier League.

The Premier League remains by far the biggest division in terms of generating revenue, which actually increased by £49m, but this was swallowed up by a £132m increase in wages. English top flight clubs spent in excess of £1.32billion on employee salaries – more than Italy’s Serie A (£0.93bn), Spain’s La Liga (£800m), the Bundesliga (£684m) and France’s Lique 1 (£615m).

The average Premier League footballer earned an estimated £21,600 a week or £1.1m a year in 2008-09 as top flight clubs each spent an average of £41m on player wages.
Germany wins over and over and over: (1) The fans get to see games at reasonable prices and can take their families along; hence the better attendance. (2) Exciting young players who come up through the system face top-level league competition early and thus sharpen their skills when representing their country. (3) More balanced competition due to the absence of megaspending foreign owners results in greater parity among teams. It's not "what the market will bear." Fans shouldn't be ripped off so horribly that Manchester United and Liverpool fans are massively annoyed at their helplessly debt-addled American owners. Definitely, English fans should press for changes in governance in the Premier League to make it, ah, more Bundesliga-like lest even worse performances materialize.

There are indeed strong parallels between what's going on in German versus English leagues that reflect political-economic governance. While neoliberalism is an orgy of liberalization, privatization and deregulation reminiscent of today's Premier League, the Bundesliga is very much in the ordoliberal vein, preferring stability, sustainability, and development. There is much you can gather on the Internet about it, but here is a brief snippet from the NYT Economix blog on ordoliberalism in today's context:
But take careful note of the name Walter Eucken, whom [Hans-Werner] Sinn references with a reverential tone that could be found only in Germany. Mr. Eucken, who died in 1950, is closely associated with a school of economics known as ordoliberalism, which teaches that state regulations can help the free market produce results close to its theoretical potential.

After World War II, ordoliberals (also known, confusingly given the argot of today’s anti-globalization protesters, as neoliberals) defended capitalism but said the state needed to play a strong role in regulating what did not come naturally. That meant ensuring stable prices, protecting property rights and – oh, how prescient this sounds today! – ensuring unlimited liability for those daring capitalists so that they bear the rewards, but also the risks, of their behavior.
Just as you would much rather have a reliable, residual value-retaining Volkswagen than a Yankee crapmobile like a Chevrolet or its (somewhat better) GM Europe equivalent Vauxhall, it would be utterly senseless to put money on the UK or US over Germany in football time and again. World Cup 2010 only validates this assertion, as if you needed any more proof.

While I don't see Germany winning the entire event--and I would honestly rather see a first-time winner as I always do--their time will come whether in Euro or World Cup tournaments. The German team is the second youngest in the tournament, so it will mature nicely before becoming England-style geezerized. Over the long term, the evidence shows ordoliberalism beats neoliberalism whether in industry or sport. If things are unsettled at home, it reflects abroad--especially on the world's biggest stage. Neoliberalism promotes boom and bust, while ordoliberalism promotes consistency. Germany always comes to play as the record shows: three World Cups victories (1954, 1974, 1990); four times runners-up (1966, 1982, 1986, 2002); thrice third place (1934, 1970, 2006); once fourth place (1958). If that weren't enough, they've won the regional Euro competition thrice (1972, 1980, 1996) as well as being runners-up thrice (1976, 1992, 2008).

It's utterly hilarious how debt-loving American and English neoliberals keep telling Germans how to run their affairs when they are so far behind in understanding how the game is played, be it the political economy of industry or football. As the saying goes, Germany plans ahead to stay ahead in whichever domain you choose. To be Deutschland uber alles, you have to work at it and have the proper attitude and determination at all levels of society. If it's any consolation, at least a 4-1 defeat at the senior level is an improvement over a 4-0 defeat at U-21, eh?

UPDATE 1: The Scotsman has more on Ozil and the multicultural German squad.

UPDATE 2: I scoop an honest-to goodness football site Goal.com in describing how the rot has set into the English Daddy Warbucks system.

Tuesday, May 4, 2010

EU: Screw Credit Rating Agencies; We'll Do Rating

Credit rating agencies have long been bogeymen for those facing down financial crises. During the Asian financial crisis, Ferri, Liu, and Stiglitz (1999) found these agencies complicit in procyclical ratings that worsened matters. Here is the abstract of their paper:
We demonstrate that credit rating agencies aggravated the East Asian crisis. In fact, having failed to predict the emergence of the crisis, rating agencies became excessively conservative. They downgraded East Asian crisis countries more than the worsening in these countries' economic fundamentals would justify. This unduly exacerbated, for these countries, the cost of borrowing abroad and caused the supply of international capital to them to evaporate. In turn, lower than deserved ratings contributed – at least for some time – to amplify the East Asian crisis. Although this goes beyond the scope of our paper, we also propose an endogenous rationale for rating agencies to become excessively conservative after having made blatant errors in predicting the East Asian crisis. Specifically, rating agencies would have an incentive to become more conservative, so as to recover from the damage these errors caused to them and to rebuild their own reputation.
Well it's 2010 and it seems these same credit rating agencies haven't learned their lesson at all. In this game of perception, have a gander at the view of market participants at what EU actions mean. To them, the ECB allowing Greek bonds to be used as collateral regardless of their credit rating is the latest in a long line of concessions to erring EMU countries:
Still, crucially, this isn't the first key rule behind the euro to be scrapped. Greece, and a number of the other 15 euro members, have already disregarded the rule that borrowing levels should be kept low. Another perceived rule, that no euro member should bail out another, has also been ignored. Now, market watchers warn that this fresh rule-bending exercise creates a further dent to the solidity of the single-currency project. "Junk debt is junk debt. You can't have different rules for different members of the euro. Otherwise, what's the point of having a single currency?" said Simon Derrick, a senior currencies analyst at The Bank of New York Mellon in London
Ah, well. Markets will markets, eh? Far more interesting has been the response from EU bigwigs, In particular, Michel Barnier, Commissioner for the Internal Market and Services, has been keen on policing the dreaded Anglo-Saxon abuses of the credit rating agencies:
"I think we need to go further to look at the impact of the ratings on the financial system or economic system as a whole...," European Internal Markets Commissioner Michel Barnier told members of the European Parliament. "That's why I asked for responsibility to be assumed in the work they are doing." Barnier added: "If you look at Greece, for example, I was quite surprised by the quite rapid deterioration in rating." His comments follow a reminder from the executive European Commission to rating agencies to be careful in their work.
The kicker, though, is that he's now proposing that the EU itself do the job of rating (or at least sponsor an organization doing so on the EU's behalf):
The European Union is examining plans to set up a European credit-ratings authority for sovereign debt ratings in the wake of the Greek crisis, the bloc’s top financial regulator said today. Financial Services Commissioner Michel Barnier is also examining whether ratings companies have too much power, he told the European Parliament’s economic and monetary affairs committee in Brussels today.

“We are undertaking work on creating a European agency,” Barnier said. “We need a very fast, but not off-the-cuff reflection,” he said. “The power of these agencies is quite considerable, not just for products but also for states.” Scrutiny of credit-ratings companies intensified after Greece’s rating was last week cut to junk status.
Is it just me or are there similar conflicts of interest inherent here as when financial service concerns approached credit rating agencies soliciting business? While credit rating agencies' reputations are deservedly junk, you have to wonder if the alternative here can be made to be worth rather more. Yes, EMU countries are probably suffering from credit rating agencies' overreaction now as during the Asian crisis. However, the 'cure' may be worse than the disease.