Showing posts with label IPE 101. Show all posts
Showing posts with label IPE 101. Show all posts

Tuesday, October 12, 2010

Explaining PRC's Growing Impatience with MNCs

Traditionally, the activities of multinational corporations have been a focus of study in international political economy (see description), though this emphasis has dwindled somewhat in recent years with the notable exception of those like Peter Dicken who study global supply chains. Now, it's no big secret that foreign multinationals operating in China are complaining about the business climate there becoming more hostile to them than it was before. For instance, a recent European Union Chamber of Commerce in China report clamours for "further transparency" and complains about the "unpredictability of laws and regulations" as risks to future investments. "Discriminatory enforcement of laws and regulations" is also brought up together with backsliding on regulatory reform, inferior market access...the list of complaints goes on and on. So whiny they are.

How do we interpret these changes? Isn't China supposed to become more open and Western-like as development continues apace? Well, not quite. If you're a longtime IPE follower, I am sure you're familiar with Raymond Vernon's notion of the "obsolescing bargain" that he described back in 1971 with Sovereignty at Bay. In essence, while the potential investor has the upper hand when the host country is a largely unknown quantity, the balance of negotiating power shifts to the host country after a while since a lot of the known unknowns and unknown unknowns mentioned by a certain sage are figured out. If it's wise, tacit knowledge is often imbibed by the host country, making foreign expertise less and less valuable. With sunk costs as a given, it is no longer so easy for multinational corporations commonly portrayed as footloose and fancy-free to move around. Here is a short description of the "obsolescing bargain":
Before the investment is sunk, risk and uncertainty are high and the potential investor should be able to extract quite favorable terms to compensate for both. these terms are enhanced by the investor's quasi-monopolistic position. But as risk and uncertainty dissipate after the project proves successful and as other potential investors emerge to erode the quasi-monopolistic position, the host finds itself in a position to renegotiate the initial terms rather than paying the opening risk premium forever [to the multinational].

The dialectic in investor-host relations produced abundant evidence of the obsolescing bargain from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s. Even in cases where no host ownership or nationalization took place, the typical time interval between negotiation and renegotiation of investment contracts shortened and the swing in tax rates alone grew by 30 to 40 percentage points.
It's certainly a researchable question if this phenomenon is at work in contemporary China. Its export infrastructure is widely recognized to be second to none, so it has very little to prove at this point in time. Contrast today's situation when they were still experimenting with special economic zones (SEZs) and had to ply foreign concerns with all sorts of incentives to set up shop in the coastal areas. Perhaps the tables have turned as per the obsolescing bargain; that's all. You've served your purpose, white man--now take it or leave it.

Thursday, August 12, 2010

Again: No Link Between Democracy and Growth

Dani Rodrik is legendary in development studies and political science in general. While perusing the handiwork of our fellow IPE bloggers at North Carolina, I was surprised to come across his new Project Syndicate article which seemed to contradict much of what he's written before. If you are a close follower of development studies, you are undoubtedly familiar with his book One Economics, Many Recipes. In that compilation, Professor Rodrik makes the case that there is no single solution alike capitalist liberal democracy as per the likes of Francis Fukuyama and neoconservatives past, present, and future. Imagine my shock when he appeared to claim that democracies outperformed authoritarian regimes in terms of generating economic growth:
Democracies not only out-perform dictatorships when it comes to long-term economic growth, but also outdo them in several other important respects.
I almost fell out of my chair. Puzzled as to why one of the most formidable econometricians in development studies would write something rather questionable, I sent an e-mail to an old sparring partner in the blogosphere. (It seems he doesn't blog that much anymore, and I can certainly vouch that blogging is not exactly the most remunerative activity.) Anyway, he has since issued a correction which goes...
Due to an oversight on my part during the editing process, the sentence that started with “Democracies not only do not underperform dictatorships when it comes to long-term economic growth..” in my original version eventually became “Democracies not only out-perform dictatorships when it comes to long-term economic growth..” in the published piece. The change imparted a superiority to democracy in terms of growth which the evidence does not find and which I did not intend to express. Thanks to Dr. Emmanuel Yujuico for taking me to task over this change, which I had not noticed until he pointed it out.
It honestly bothers me that I was the first to notice this factual error. On the aforementioned webpage, there are supposedly 134 Facebook shares and 41 retweets, yet nobody bothered to flag this up. What worries me is that few folks are really that familiar with the literature or do not read closely enough.

This subject matter--the relationship between democracy and economic growth--has been researched to the point of becoming a cliche, but overall, econometric analysis yields a null result. There is, statistically speaking, no evidence that democracy has a direct impact on economic growth. None. Nada. Zip. Zilch. A paper that I can suggest for those unfamiliar with this area is Doucouliagos and Olubasoglu's meta-analysis--or an econometric study of studies--that provides a similar conclusion. (There's also a non-gated earlier version.) At best, democracy only has positive "indirect" effects, but it alone doesn't make it significantly more likely that economic growth will occur.

As for the freedom-and-growth shtick, save it for Wolfowitz, Perle, and Feith. To state things correctly, authoritarianism may not necessarily be conducive to economic growth, but neither is democracy. There are many political recipes for economic growth, period.